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Abstract 
 The Precautionary Principle (“PP”) as formulated in the context of climate change 
requires countries to take measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate 
change and mitigate its adverse impacts despite a lack of full scientific certainty as to such 
causes. The Differentiated Responsibility Principle (“the DR Principle”) recognizes a 
common responsibility of all countries to prevent climate change and calls on developed 
states to assume a leadership role in the global effort to prevent climate change. The DR 
Principle requires some developed countries to place a restriction on their GHG emissions. 
Unfortunately this means that at least in the short term, developing countries are not subject 
to greenhouse gas (GHG) emission targets, thereby exacerbating the climate change 
problem. 
 Implementing the DR Principle in this manner conflicts with the PP. To avoid this 
conflict, the DR Principle should be formulated in a manner which demands some restriction 
on GHG emission, by developing countries. Efforts to prevent human induced climate 
change should be made by all countries regardless of their individual culpability for climate 
change if the PP is to have effect. 
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  Introduction and Overview 
 
 The Precautionary Principle, (“PP”) and the Differentiated Responsibility Principle 
(“DR Principle”) have increasingly been recognized in international environmental 
agreements.1 The PP is a proactive approach to environmental problems.  In some of its 
formulations, the PP requires that where there is a risk of harm to the environment, parties 
should take measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of such harm even if 
there is no scientific certainty regarding the harm.2 In some instances, the measures that 
parties should take in order to enforce the PP are differentiated. The PP arose out of the 
inadequacy of the assimilative capacity approach to environmental problems, which presume 
that the environment has an infinite capacity to accommodate the influence of human 
activity without unacceptable consequences.3  
 There are different forms of the PP in international environmental agreements 
resulting in a lack of uniformity in its meaning.4 For example, some international 
environmental agreements state that in cases where there is a risk of harm to the 
environment, positive action to protect the environment should not be delayed while waiting 
                                                 
1See for example: The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992.For a full text of the 
Convention, 31 I.L.M 849 [“FCCC”]; Kyoto Protocol to the United   Nations   Framework Convention on 
Climate Change 1997.UN Doc.FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1 article 3 (1) [“the Protocol”].For a full text of the 
Protocol see 37 I.L.M 32. 
2Bamako Convention on Tran’s Boundary Hazardous Waste: (Bamako Convention on Hazardous 
Wastes Within Africa, Jan. 30, 1991, art. 4, 30 I.L.M. 773) (“Bamako Convention”). 
3O. McIntyre and T. Mosedale, “The Precautionary Principle as a Norm of Customary International Law’’ 
(1997) 9 J. Envt’.L  221 at 222 [O McIntyre and T Mosedale, “The Precautionary Principle”]. 
4 For example, Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development in the ECE-Region, 
UNDoc.A/CONF.151/PC/ 10 (1990), reprinted in 1Y.B Int’l Envtl. L 429, 431 (1990). [“Bergen Ministerial 
Declaration”].The United Nations Environment  Programme, (Report of the Governing Council on the work of 
its Fifteenth session, U.N GAOR, 44th Session, Supp. No.25,12th, mtg. at 153,) [“UNEP”]. 
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 for irrefutable scientific proof of harm to become available.5 Other formulations of the PP 
require parties to take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes 
of an environmental harm.6 
 The DR Principle acknowledges a differentiated responsibility among countries to 
protect the environment based on their contributions to environmental problems and their 
ability to rectify the problem. The DR Principle provides for different, less onerous 
standards for some countries over others.7  
The PP and the DR Principle are not opposites. They compliment each other and are 
often used together in international environmental agreements.8 In some instances, they 
together promote universal participation in order to protect the environment.9 However in 
other instances, some aspects of the DR Principle tend to deviate from the aims of the PP.10 
The latter situation manifests itself under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
                                                 
5Bamako Convention, supra note 2. See also Also, Arie  Trouwburst, Evolution and Status of the 
Precautionary Principle in International Law (London: Kluwer Law International, 2002) 15 [ Arie 
Trouwburst  Evolution and Status of the Precautionary Principle ]. 
6See for example the FCCC  supra  note 1 at article 3. 
7Monica Brookman, “Equality Among Unequals in International Environmental Law” (2000) 25  Columbia 
Journal of Environmental Law, 369 at 373. [Monica Brookman, “Equality Among Unequals in International 
Environmental Law”]. 
8The FCCC supra note 1 at article 3, the Protocol supra note 1 at article 3. 
9The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987 (entered into force Jan.1 
1989), 26 I.L.M 1541 [“Montreal Protocol”]. Montreal Protocol demonstrates the extent to which  the use of 
differential responsibilities can promote universal participation in view of the fact that most developing 
countries in addition to developed ones have joined the Montreal Protocol. See also, Anita Margrethe 
Halvorssen, Equality Among Unequals in International Environmental Law, Differential Treatment for 
Developing Countries, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999) 4. For the suggestion that the Montreal Protocol has 
succeeded in phasing out emissions of ozone depleting agents see, Timothy  Swanson  & Robin Mason, The 
Impact of Multilateral Agreements: The Case of the Montreal Protocol( Fondazione Eni Enrico Matte Note di 
Lavoro, Working Paper No 81, 2002) available online at http://www.feem.it/NR/rdonlyres/5542/5542BA50-
4119-4546-8989-3D4CC55CEA37/184/8102.pdf . (Last visited on 24th August, 2005).(Arguing inter alia that 
the regime promoted by the Montreal Protocol has significantly diminished the emissions of  
chlorofluorocarbons). 
10A. Boyle, “Comment on D. Pone Nava’s Paper on Capacity-Building” in W.Lang (ed.,) Sustainable 
Development and International Law (London ; Boston : Graham & Trotman/M. Nijhoff, 1995) 139, (“…there 
are two contradictory trends in international environmental law-making. On the one hand, the international 
community is seeking a precautionary approach to environmental issues whilst on the other hand; the 
obligations it adopts are qualified by reference to the capabilities of the states concerned”). 
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 Climate Change, (“FCCC”)11and the Kyoto Protocol, (“Protocol”) 12 which are the key 
international legal documents that encourage countries to prevent or mitigate the impact of 
climate change. 
 The FCCC requires countries to … “take precautionary measures to anticipate, 
prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects…”13 The 
FCCC further states that: 
…where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures, taking into 
account that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-
effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost.14 
 
The aim of the PP here is to prevent climate change or at least mitigate its adverse 
consequences by means of measures which are cost effective. Consequently in applying the 
PP, responsibilities may be differentiated on grounds that measures which may be cost 
effective for a party may not necessarily be so for another.   
 Arguably, the causes and consequences associated with human induced climate 
change appear to be known.15 Scientists say that climate change commonly known as global 
warming is caused by the emission of heat trapping gases known as greenhouse gases 
(“GHGs.”) produced by vehicles, power plants and deforestation. As these gases build up, 
they act like a big blanket, over-heating the planet and threatening global health, economy 
                                                 
11FCCC, supra note 1. 
12The Protocol, supra note 1. 
13FCCC, supra note 1 at article 3(3). 
14Ibid. 
15See generally, E. Christie, “The Greenhouse Gases and Environmental Law” (1990) 7 Envt’l &Planning L.J 
114. Daniel Bodansky, ‘‘ The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A 
Commentary’’(1993) 18 Yale Journal of International Law 455-6 [D. Bodansky, ‘‘Commentary’’],  Jeremy 
Leggett, “Global Warming: The Scientific Evidence and its Implications” (1992) 2 Transnat’l L & Contemp 
Problems 1, Katharine Q. Seelye & Andrew C. Revkin, Panel Tells Bush Global Warming is Getting Worse, 
N.Y Times, June 7, 2001 at A1., Alanna Mitchell, Scientists Raise Alarm of Climate Catastrophe, The  Globe 
& Mail, Jan.22, 2001 at A1.For an overview of the current literature on the causes and risks of climate change, 
see generally, National Academy of Sciences, “Climate Change Science, An Analysis of  Some Key 
Questions” available online at http://www4.nationalacademics.org/nashome.nsf. (Last visited on 24th August,  
2005).  
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 and environment.16 As a result of their huge industrial activities and reliance on fossil fuels, 
developed countries, especially the United States, emit more than one half of current global 
GHG’s. However, evidence also suggests that developing countries for example China and 
India are emitting GHG’s at an increasing rate which emissions may surpass that of 
developed countries in future.17 While it may be argued that owing to the distribution of 
carbon sinks within its jurisdiction, some developed countries like Canada may use carbon 
sinks to offset ongoing GHG emissions, the same may not be said of developing countries. 
 Scientists also say that climate change will lead to a rise in sea levels,  
meteorological instability, departure from normal agricultural conditions, increased rainfall 
leading to increased pollution due to run off, and increased instances of heat stress leading to 
respiratory illness.18 The rise in atmospheric greenhouse gas emissions is closely correlated 
with increasing rates of fossil fuel combustion associated with each type of energy end-use 
(for example, trucking, electric lighting, heating, and cooling) depending on the composition 
and quantity of the fuel used to generate the energy.19 
 Despite the fears about a threat of serious harm, full scientific certainty as to the 
causes and consequences of climate change has not been achieved.20 There is still some 
scientific uncertainty surrounding the extent to which climatic conditions will vary and when 
                                                 
16Ibid. 
17Nielson, Chris P. and Michael B. McElroy. “Introduction and Overview.” In Energizing China: 
Reconciling Environmental Protection and Economic Growth. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 
1997:27. 
18See David Boyd, Unnatural Law, Rethinking Canadian Environmental Law and Policy (Vancouver: UBC 
Press 2003) 83-4. 
19Ibid. 
20See generally, Para 5 of the preamble to FCCC supra note 1 (…there are many uncertainties in predictions of 
climate change particularly with regard to timing, magnitude and regional patterns thereof) Lakshman 
Guruswamy, “Climate Change: The Next Dimension”(2000) 15 J. Land Use & Envtl. Law, 341.[Lakshman 
Guruswamy, “Climate Change”]. Also, US Global Change Research Program, The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, available online at http://www.usgcrp.gov/usgcrp/IPCCINFO.html. (Last visited on 13th April, 
2004) also, Working Group 11, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Summary for Policymakers: 
Scientific- Technical Analysis of Impacts, Adaptations and Mitigation of Climate Change”, available online at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/sarsum2.htm, at 3.2 (Last visited on 13th April 2004). 
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 forecast changes will occur.21 Also, owing to the possibility of inaccurate prediction, it is 
unreliable to depend solely on scenario modelling to determine the possibility and extent of 
climate change.22 Finally, there is a preventative motive behind the formulation of the PP in 
the FCCC. As a result, there is an ongoing need to apply the PP to climate change even if the 
causes and risks associated with climate change appear to be known.23  
 Under the FCCC, countries are required to protect the climate system for the benefit 
of present and future generations of humankind on the basis of equity and in accordance with 
their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.24 This aspect 
of the DR Principle translates into restrictions on GHG emission by a majority of developed 
countries, which are expected to take the lead in combating climate change without placing 
similar restrictions on developing countries.25 Developing countries are expected to 
contribute as much as 45% of GHG emissions within the next few years. As a result, the DR 
Principle becomes a vehicle to exacerbate human induced climate change. Unfortunately, the 
Protocol also adopts the DR Principle.26   
                                                 
21Ibid., See also, Andrew C. Revkin, “Global Waffling: When Will We Be Sure?” ,N.Y Times, Sept 10, 2000 at 
WK3 (discussing the disconnect between scientific evidence and the level of certainty required before policy 
makers will be required to take action, which creates a risk that by the time policy actions are taken, it may be 
too late to do any good) J.D Mahlman, “Uncertainties in Projections of Human-Caused  Climate Warming” 
(1997) 278 Sci. 1416. S.Fred Singer, “An Assessment of the Kyoto Protocol, Transcript from Panel Discussion, 
April 15, 1999, (1999) 11 Geo Int’l Envtl.L. Rev 767, B.D Santer et al., “Interpreting Differential Temperature 
Trends at the Surface and in the Lower Troposphere”, (2000) 287 Sci 1231.Also Daniel Sarewitz &Roger 
Pielke, Jr, “Breaking the Global –Warming Gridlock” July 2000, Atlantic Monthly, 55, also available online at: 
http//www.theatlantic.com/issues/2000/07/sarewitz3.htm ( Last visited on 29th March, 2004). 
22 Brian Wynne & Sue Mayer, How Science Fails the Environment, New Scientist, June 5, 1993 at 31 
Vern R Walker, “The Siren Songs of Science: Towards a Taxonomy of Scientific Uncertainty for Decision    
Makers” (1991) 23 Conn .L.Rev.567. 
23Canada, Elements of Precaution: Recommendations for the Regulation of Food Biotechnology in Canada ( 
An expert Panel Report on the Future of Food Biotechnology Prepared by the Royal Society of Canada at the 
request of Health Canada, Canadian Food Inspection Agency and Environment Canada, January 2001, Chapter 
8 at 197, available online at http/www.agbios.com/docroot/articles/2001035_A.pdf. (Last visited on 10th May, 
2004). [“Canada, Elements of Precaution”]. 
24Emphasis supplied. See FCCC, supra note 1 at article 3(3). 
25Ibid. Some less developed countries and states with economies in transition are also exempted from the    
   requirement to place restrictions on emissions of GHGs. 
26The Protocol supra note 1 at article 3(1). 
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  Arguments exist to support the desirability of the DR Principle in international 
environmental agreements. For example, the DR Principle leads to environmental and 
economic justice by ensuring equity in international relations.27 In the context of climate 
change, the DR Principle is argued to be fair because it leads to a situation in which the cost 
of preventing and or mitigating climate change is shared among countries that are 
historically responsible for creating it.28 It can also be argued that the DR Principle promotes 
the idea of cost effectiveness which has been formulated as a basic consideration in 
implementing policies and measures to prevent climate change. 
 However, the situation whereby there is no restriction on GHG emission by 
developing countries undermines the preventative philosophy of the PP under the FCCC. 
Emission of GHGs without restraint by developing countries will lead to global warming.29  
Significant portions of GHG emissions from developing countries are attributable to 
multinational corporations of the developed world which operate in developing countries. 
Such multi-national corporations are often involved in oil exploration and production or in 
other activities which involve the utilization of fossil fuels. A situation whereby developing 
countries are required to place a limit on their emissions of GHGs on the basis of the PP will 
compel developing countries to enact national laws which will regulate the activities of these 
corporations with regard to emission of GHGs. 
 As developing countries account for a rapidly rising share of GHG emissions,30 
efforts of developed countries alone will not be sufficient to prevent climate change. Such 
                                                 
27See generally, Cheng Zheng-Khang, “Equity, Special Considerations and the Third World”(1990) 1 
Colombia Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 57 at 61-63[Cheng Zheng - Khang, “Equity, 
Special Considerations”] .  
28Ibid.  
29Ibid. See also, Monica Brookman, “Equality Among Unequals in International Environmental Law”, supra 
note 7.   
 6
 efforts could easily be offset by developing countries’ increasing emissions of GHGs, a 
situation permitted by the DR Principle.31  
 The potentially vast magnitude of climate change and the fundamental scientific 
uncertainties surrounding it make it imperative for the PP to be the watchword in the global 
effort to prevent climate change. The atmosphere reacts the same way to emissions from 
developed countries as it does to those from developing countries. The atmosphere is 
indivisible and the effect of emissions generated in one country is felt everywhere.32  As a 
result, broad participation by all to prevent climate change is a long-term regulatory 
necessity. No one country has the capability to protect the global climate by its efforts 
alone.33 Thus, developing countries should not be allowed to emit GHGs without restraint 
even in the short term, as there is a need for all countries to reduce their emission of GHGs 
in order to prevent and mitigate climate change. This view is supported by the fact that 
GHGs emitted today by developing countries are cumulative, long lasting and continue to 
lead to climate change regardless of efforts by developed countries that accept a limitation 
on their emission of GHGs. Accordingly, the differing obligations the FCCC and the 
Protocol place on developed and developing countries are unsatisfactory from the point of 
view of environmental protection.  
 The following analysis is based upon the following assumptions: 
                                                                                                                                                      
30World Energy Council, “Statement to the Third Conference of the Parties to the UN Climate Convention” 
available online at http://www.worldenergy.org/wec-
eis/publications/default/archives/other_documents/WECstmt1297.asp.(Last visited on 22nd February, 2004). 
See also Deborah E Cooper, “The Kyoto Protocol and China: Global Warming’s Sleeping Giant” (1999) 11 
Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 401.   
31Paul G Harris, “What’s Fair?  International Justice from an Environmental Perspective” available online at 
http://www.ciaonet.org/isa/hap01.html. (Last visited on March 31, 2004). 
32See also Christopher D. Stone, “The Global Warming Crisis, if there is One, and the Law” (1989-1990) 5 
Am. U. J. Int’l L & Pol’y 497 at 500. 
33Edith Brown Weiss, “International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a New 
World Order” (1993) 81 Geo L.J 706. 
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 (a) The current regime for the control of GHG emission is not final. Accordingly, 
countries may, in due course, have an agreement as to the restriction that will be 
placed on developing countries in respect of GHG emission. 
(b) The present level of GHG emission by some developing countries is not high but 
their future emission of GHG will lead to climate change. 
 Given the foregoing assumptions, the question may be asked as to why it matters that 
developing countries should be required to be bound by restrictions on their emissions of 
GHGs at this point in time when they may likely be required to restrict their emissions in 
due course. The answer to this question is simple. First, it is not yet certain that developing 
countries will agree to be bound by GHG emission restraints in the future. As of 2002, 
developing countries were united in their opposition to any suggestion that there should be 
commitment on their part to limit their emissions of GHG.34 Some of these developing 
countries like China, India and Nigeria are home to corporations involved in oil exploration 
activities and rely on coal fired power plants which result in massive GHG emissions.  
Accordingly, it may seem ambitious to accept assumption (a) above. 
 Second, GHGs emitted today by developing countries, which are cumulative and 
long lasting and are not territorially specific, will lead to climate change in future. 
Developing countries are expected to account for 45% of worldwide GHG emissions by 
2010 and some developing countries are expected to have greater growth in emissions than 
most developed countries. As a result, it is necessary to emphasize the need for developing 
countries to have restrictions on their emissions of GHGs immediately. 
                                                 
34Eighth Conference of the Parties to the U.N Framework Convention on Climate Change, 42 Earth 
Negotiations Bulletin, No 209 available online at: <http//www.iisd.ca/linkages/download/asc/enbl2209e.txt 
(Last visited on 23rd May, 2005). 
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  Chapter 1 of the thesis discusses the origin, meaning, and basic elements of the PP.  
It also discusses the emergence of the PP in international environmental law.  
Chapter 2 focuses on the origin, meaning and some implications of the DR Principle. 
As well, the chapter discusses some aspects of the theoretical framework for the DR 
Principle. The relevance of this discussion is twofold. First, some of the arguments for and 
against the DR Principle can be distilled when the subject is viewed from a theoretical 
perspective. Second, placing the DR Principle within a theoretical context elucidates its 
meaning and wider implications.  
 Chapter 3 examines application of the PP and the DR Principle in the context of 
climate change. The chapter starts with a brief overview of the meaning of climate change 
and then briefly examines the international action as well as the international legal response 
to climate change. The provisions on PP and the DR Principle under the FCCC and the 
Protocol are then discussed. The chapter concludes with an analysis on the intersection of PP 
and the DR Principle and some consequences of applying the zero emission reduction aspect 
of DR Principle in the climate change regime. 
 Finally, Chapter 4 presents conclusions arising from the analysis outlined in the 
previous chapters of the thesis. 
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 1 The Precautionary Principle in International Environmental Law 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
 
 This chapter will examine the origin, the meaning, and the importance of the PP. 
The basic elements of the PP and the emergence of the PP in international environmental 
law will conclude the discussion. The chapter is necessary in order to show that the 
conceptual basis of the PP is to prevent environmental harm before its occurrence 
regardless of the absence of scientific certainty about such harm. The sub-section 
describing the basic elements of the PP is included to provide an overview of steps 
involved in applying the PP. The discussion on the emergence of the PP in international 
environmental law shows that a majority of international environmental agreements adopt 
the PP. 
1.2     Origin of the PP 
 It is generally recognized that the PP originates from the German word 
vorsorgeprinzip (hereafter referred to as “vorsorge’’), which literally means foresight.1 
At the core of vorsorge is the belief that society should prevent environmental damage by 
careful planning in order to avoid potentially harmful activities. Vorsorge later developed 
in the early 1970s into a fundamental principle of German environmental law.2  
                                                 
1Ronnie Harding & Elizabeth Fisher, “Introducing the Precautionary Principle” in Ronnie Harding & 
Elizabeth Fisher eds., Perspectives on the Precautionary Principle (Sydney: The Federation Press, 1999) 4 
[ Ronnie Harding & Elizabeth Fisher eds., “Introducing  the Precautionary Principle”]. 
2By the early 1970’s, the PP could be found in the domestic West German legislation in respect of 
environmental policies aimed at combating the problems of global warming, acid rain and maritime 
pollution. See W Gullet, ‘‘Environmental Protection and the Precautionary Principle, A Response to 
Scientific Uncertainty in Environmental Management’’ (1997) 14 EPLJ 52 at 55. See also, Arie  
Trouwburst, Evolution and Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law (London: Kluwer 
Law International, 2002) 16-31.[ Arie Trouwburst  Evolution and Status of the Precautionary Principle].  
 10
  At the time vorsorge appeared in Germany, environmental issues had assumed an 
important position in German society. As a result, there was a clear recognition of the 
discrepancy between statutory provisions and the goals of environmental policy on the 
one hand and the practical application of vorsoge on the other hand.3 In response, 
vorsorge was incorporated into German law requiring that action must be taken before 
full scientific understanding of the relationship between human activity and 
environmental damage is known.4 Vorsoge also requires the German government to 
promote technical developments and engineering solutions to reduce pollutant discharge 
levels and to contribute to the introduction of cleaner production technologies in the 
private sector.5  
 As a result of its success in German domestic law, the PP came to be accepted in 
international environmental law.6 The first explicit reference to the PP in an international 
environmental agreement is found in the 1987 London Declaration of the Second 
International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea.7 Since this conference, the 
PP has been included in several international and regional conventions and agreements, 
especially those which deal with activities for which there is no scientific certainty 
regarding environmental safety.8  
 
                                                 
3S. Boehmer –Christiansen, “The Precautionary Principle in Germany-Enabling Government” in T O’ 
Riordan and J Cameron eds. Interpreting the Precautionary Principle. (London: Earth scan Publications 
Ltd, 1994), 31. [S. Boehmer –Christiansen, “The Precautionary Principle in Germany-Enabling 
Government”]. 
4S. Boehmer –Christiansen, “The Precautionary Principle in Germany-Enabling Government” ibid.  
5 Ronnie Harding & Elizabeth Fisher eds., “Introducing  the Precautionary Principle”, supra  note 1 at 4. 
6Ibid. 
7Second International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea, Nov. 24-25, 1987, 27.I.L.M 835 
(“London Declaration”). 
8See for example, Annex 1 of Energy Charter Treaty: The Draft European Energy Charter Treaty 
I, Sept. 14, 1994, 27/ 94 CONF. 104, also Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of 
Wild Animals, June 23,1979, 19 I.L.M 11,15-16(entered into force Nov .1,1985), “Convention on 
the Conservation of Migratory Species.” 
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 1.3   Meaning and Importance of the PP 
One of the most pressing challenges facing the international community today is 
maintaining a healthy environment.9 This challenge can best be appreciated when 
weighed against the background that our common future depends on a healthy 
environment. The international community has given priority to this challenge by 
establishing various legal and institutional frameworks to address threats to the 
environment.10 The PP is one such principle, aimed at minimizing the negative impacts of 
human interaction upon the biophysical environment. 
 The PP lacks a common definition. The ongoing evolution of the term has led to 
numerous interpretations of the PP.11 Some interpretations say that the PP ensures the 
exercise of caution by insisting that where there is scientific uncertainty about the effect 
of an activity with potential risks on the environment, those who wish to engage in the 
activity should establish that it is safe before proceeding.12 Other interpretations demand 
                                                 
9See generally, M.K Tolba et al. eds., The World Environment 1972—1992: Two Decades of Challenge, 
(London: Chapman & Hall, 1992). For an examination of global environmental problems which need 
attention, see David A. Wirth, “Environmental Law: Trends in Legal Education and Scholarship: Teaching 
and Research in International Environmental Law” (1999) 23 Harvard Environmental Law Review 423. 
10See generally, United Nations Resolution on Institutional and Financial Arrangements, GA Res. 2997 
(xxvii), UN GAOR, 27th Sess., Supp. No 1, UN Doc.A/8783 (1972).  
11Ellen Hey, “The Precautionary Concept in Environmental Policy and Law: Institutionalizing Caution,” 
(1992) 4 Geo. Int’l Envt’l L.Rev. 303, (The meaning of PP is unclear).  
Also R. Harding and L. Fisher, ‘‘The Precautionary Principle in Australia: A Background Paper’’ Paper 
Presented at the Precautionary Principle Conference, Institute of Environmental Studies, University of 
New South Wales, September 1999, 3, 5. (Defining PP with any degree of precision has proved 
problematic) 
12Principle 15 of The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development:( June 14, 1992 31). Available 
online at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm.(Last visited on  14th May, 
2004) (“The Rio Declaration”).For other examples of international treaties that adopted the PP thereby 
deviating from the traditional concepts of legal and scientific proof that call on parties to adopt decisions 
“based upon scientific findings or methods” see, Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species 
supra  note  8, Arts 111(2) and XI(3) (advocates ‘‘action on the basis of ‘‘reliable evidence, including  the 
best scientific evidence available’’) UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the World Cultural and 
Natural Heritage, Nov. 16, 1972, 27 u.st 37,40,11 I.L.M.1358 (entered into force July 15,1975); 
Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, June 1,1972, annex 7(a),11 I.L.M 21,261.  (Entered 
into force Mar 11,1978); International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec 2, 1946, art v(2) 
161,U.N.T.S 72.(Entered into force Nov 10,1948), amended Nov 19,1956,338 U.N.T.S 336, or “in the light 
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 that in the event of scientific uncertainty, the onus lies on those who allege potential risk 
to establish that the activity is unsafe.13 In addition, there are some formulations of the PP 
that merely require parties to apply the PP only when there is uncertainty about the effect 
of an activity on the environment “based upon scientific methods or findings.”14 These 
differences have led some to use the term “Precautionary Approach” rather than the PP to 
distinguish the fact whereas a Precautionary Approach merely requires parties to be 
careful about the effects of an activity on the environment, the PP expects such parties to 
take steps to prevent environmental degradation if there is a possibility of such harm. In 
other words, the PP requires a higher degree of caution than a Precautionary Approach.15 
Other commentators say that the term “Precautionary Approach” indicates that there is as 
yet no general acceptance of the idea of “Precaution” to merit labelling it as a principle.16 
Whether seen as a Principle or an Approach, the essence of Precaution is same. 
According to Freestone: 
The precautionary approach then is innovative, because it 
changes the role of scientific data. It requires that once 
environmental damage is threatened, action should be taken to 
control or abate possible environmental interference even though 
                                                                                                                                                 
of knowledge available at the time” I.L.O Convention (No 115) Concerning the Protection of Workers 
Against ionizing Radiation, June 22, 1960, art. (3)(1), 431 U.N.T.S.41, 44. (Entered into force June 17, 
1962). 
13London Declaration, supra   note 7. 
14For example see, Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, June 1,1972, annex 7(a),11 I.L.M 
21,261  (entered into force Mar 11,1978); International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec 2, 
1946, art v(2) 161,U.N.T.S 72,(entered into force Nov 10,1948), amended Nov 19,1956,338 U.N.T.S 336, 
or “in the light of knowledge available at the time” I.L.O Convention (No 115) Concerning the Protection 
of Workers Against Ionizing Radiation, June 22, 1960, art. (3)(1), 431 U.N.T.S.41, 44 (entered into force 
June 17, 1962). 
15 “A Cautionary Tale: Fish Don’t Lay Tomatoes, A Report on the Gene Technology Bill 2000”, (Canberra, 
November 2000) available online at 
<http:www.aph.gov.au/Senate/Committee/clac_ctte/gene/report/index.htm.(Last visited on 7th April, 2004). 
16Michele D Carter, “Selling Science under the SPS Agreement: Accommodating Consumer Preference in 
the growth Hormones Controversy” (1997) 6 Minn .J Global Trade 625,at 626. See also, David Wirth, “The 
Role of Science in the Uruguay Round and NAFTA Trade Disciplines” (1994) 27 Cornell Int’l L.J 818. 
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 there may still be scientific uncertainty as to the effects of the 
activities.17 
 
 Notwithstanding the differing interpretations, the PP is fundamentally a principle 
about how technology developers, regulators and persons should handle uncertainties 
when assessing risks associated with the effect of any activity on the environment. 
Accordingly, the PP is applicable to all policy instruments, which advocates that 
regulatory action ought to be taken to avoid the risk of environmental degradation even 
when there is incomplete, or no scientific evidence as to the magnitude or potential 
impact of such degradation.  
 The PP has attracted three major criticisms. First, opponents argue that adherence 
to the PP is unscientific and assumes the worst-case scenario on the basis of unfounded 
fears.18 Second, they contend that the PP is unattractive because it focuses on unproven 
and sometimes baseless threats.19 Third, opponents argue that the PP can stall innovation 
in that it inhibits economic and technological development.20 
 Although the criticisms have some merit, the PP seeks to avoid harm to the 
environment. Nevertheless, the criticisms have led to a situation whereby the influence of 
the PP is not strong.21 Further, the influence of the PP has been adversely affected by 
                                                 
17David Freestone, “The Road to Rio: International Environmental Law after the Earth Summit” (1994)                                            
6 Journal of Environmental Law, 211. 
18Ibid also Cass R Sunstein, “A Paralyzing Principle.” Available online at 
http//www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/reg25n4/v25n4-9.pdf(Last visited on 20th March, 2004). [Cass R 
Sunstein, “A Paralyzing Principle”]. 
19Ibid. 
20Bernard A Weintraub, “Science, International Environmental Regulation, and the Precautionary Principle: 
Setting Standards and Defining Terms” (1992) 1 New York University Environmental Law Journal 173. 
(Examining the nature, development and criticism of the principle, noting the difficulty in applying the 
principle while also promoting growth), [Bernard A Weintraub, “Science, International Environmental 
Regulation”].Also, Cass R  Sunstein, “The Paralyzing Principle” supra note 18. 
21 Bernard A Weintraub, “Science, International Environmental Regulation” ibid. Cass R Sunstein, “A     
    Paralyzing Principle”, supra  note 18.  
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 failure of domestic and international instruments to provide details regarding its meaning 
and scope when they have incorporated it. For example, some formulations of the PP in 
international law fail to stipulate the type of measures that should be undertaken to 
operationalize it.22 Likewise, domestic legislation frequently adopts the PP as an 
objective or goal, but then relegates it to a mere discretionary consideration or, at most, a 
guiding principle.23 This has led to a situation whereby there is no precision in 
interpretation.  
 Generalized and sometimes vague statements of the PP in international 
instruments need to be defined to avoid ambiguities, inconsistencies and uncertainties.24 
Perhaps if the PP is given a common definition in international environmental 
agreements, countries will enact it as a binding rule in domestic legislation and its 
influence will be strengthened. Finally, the influence of the PP could be strengthened by 
educating decision makers as to its role.  
  For the purposes of this thesis, the PP is discussed in the sense in which it is 
formulated in the FCCC. The FCCC provides that “countries should take precautionary 
measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its 
adverse impacts despite a lack of full scientific certainty as to such causes.”25 The above 
formulation of the PP recognizes that that the absence of scientific certainty shall not be 
used as a reason to postpone measures aimed at preventing climate change thereby 
accepting that it is better to err on the side of caution than to risk the effects of climate 
                                                 
22See for example, FCCC supra note 1 at article 3(3). 
23See for example, Preamble to Canadian Environmental Protection Act, S.C 1999 c.33 [Preamble to 
CEPA]. 
24See generally, James E Hickey & Vern R Walker, “Refining the Precautionary Principle in International 
Environmental Law’’ (1995) 14 Virginia Environmental Law Journal 423. [James E Hickey & Vern R 
Walker, “Refining the Precautionary Principle”]. 
25FCCC, supra note 1 at article 3(3). 
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 change. Accordingly, the PP represents a new legal response to the scientific 
uncertainties surrounding the environment’s capacity to cope with increasing demands 
for prevention and/or mitigation of climate change.  
1. 4  Basic Elements of the PP 
      In international environmental law, the PP defines the obligations of states with 
respect to the protection of the environment. The PP encourages states to act in 
anticipation of environmental harm in order to prevent its occurrence. The PP calls for 
action on early warnings when there is a possibility that an activity will lead to 
environmental harm even if the exact nature and magnitude of such harm is unknown. 
The PP therefore imposes a responsibility on originators of potentially harmful activities 
to thoroughly study and minimize risks, and to evaluate and choose the safest alternatives 
to meet a particular need. It also proposes that activities that are likely to cause harm to 
the environment should be avoided even where scientific evidence of their harmfulness is 
not conclusive.26  
 There are four basic elements involved in an analysis of the PP namely: 
 ( i )  identifying the risk; 
 ( ii )     making the decision to act or not to act; 
 ( iii )    deciding how to act, i.e the measures resulting from application of the PP; and,  
 ( iv )  reversing the  burden of proof. 
1.4.1 Identifying the Risk 
 Before applying the PP, a decision on how to determine risk must be made since 
scientific uncertainty about the risk of harm invokes the PP. Consequently, a rational 
                                                 
26W. Gullet, ‘‘Environmental Protection and the ‘‘Precautionary Principle’’: A Response to Scientific 
Uncertainty in Environmental Management”, (1997)14 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 52 [W. 
Gullet, “Environmental Protection and the Precautionary Principle”]. 
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 basis for assuming that risk exists is needed. This basis is derived from an evaluation of 
data relating to the risks. In practice, this step is often undertaken in conjunction with the 
decision to act. 
1.4.2 Making the Decision to Act or not to Act 
 In some of its formulations, the PP is invoked when an established threshold of 
risk of environmental harm is met notwithstanding that the consequences of an activity 
cannot be fully demonstrated or quantified. Risk in this context may be defined as “the 
amalgam of the probability of an event occurring and the seriousness of the consequences 
should the risk occur.”27  
 When considering whether precautionary measures are necessary to protect the 
environment, a scientific evaluation of the potential adverse effects of an activity is 
undertaken based on the available data. Where feasible, a risk assessment should consider 
the possibility of a hazard’s occurrence and the severity of such a hazards impact on the 
environment, should it occur. Persons entrusted with the duty of enforcing the PP should 
be aware of uncertainty when adopting measures based on scientific assessment of risk. 
This is because the scientific data are not always sufficient to allow one to come to the 
conclusion of whether risk exists or not.28  
 It is only where the decision maker faces the dilemma of having to act or not to 
act that the PP is invoked. What factors influence the decision to act? Commentators have 
identified two degrees of confidence: a reasonable scientific possibility and a reasonable 
                                                 
27J. Cameron, W. Wade-Gery and J Abouchar, “Precautionary Principle and Future Generations” in 
Emmanuel Agius et al eds., Future Generations and International Law (London: EarthScan Publications 
1998), at 101. 
28 Canada, Elements of Precaution: Recommendations for the Regulation of Food Biotechnology in Canada 
( An expert Panel Report on the Future of Food Biotechnology Prepared by the Royal Society of Canada at 
the request of Health Canada, Canadian Food Inspection Agency and Environment Canada, January 2001, 
Chapter 8 at 197, available online at: http/www.agbios.com/docroot/articles/2001035_A.pdf. (Last visited 
on 10th May, 2004). [“Canada, Elements of Precaution”]. 
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 scientific probability.29A reasonable scientific possibility is said to exist when a 
conclusion is supported by available empirical scientific data even though some experts 
might disagree with such conclusion.30 On the other hand, a reasonable scientific 
probability exists when there is a general consensus and acceptance of the methodology. 
In this case, there may not be unanimity of opinion, but certainly a majority opinion 
exists. The degree of confidence that should be invoked is determined on a case-by-case 
basis. From the point of view of environmental protection, however, the better approach 
appears to be that as soon as there is a reasonable scientific probability that an activity 
will have adverse consequences on the environment, the PP should be applied.  
1.4.3 Deciding how to Act 
 As soon as a decision is made that a particular activity could have adverse 
consequences on the environment, action must be taken to prevent or at least mitigate 
those adverse consequences.31 The action that may be taken in order to operationalize the 
PP differs depending upon the context. Some formulations of the PP offer little guidance 
as to the measures that should be taken when there is a risk of damage to the 
environment. For example, under Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration,32 there is no 
stipulation as to how to control the risk or about what level of risk is acceptable. 
Similarly, the 1992 Helsinki Convention on the Protection and use of Trans- Boundary 
                                                 
29J.E Hickey Jr and V.R Walker, ‘‘Refining the Precautionary Principle” supra note 24 at 449. 
30Ibid. 
31See generally, J. Applegate, “A Beginning Not an End in Itself: The Role of Risk Assessment in 
Environmental Decision Making”, (1995) 63 University of Cincinnati Law Review 1643. 
32 The Rio Declaration, supra note  12. 
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 Watercourses and International Lakes 33 requires parties to be guided by the PP but 
leaves them free to decide what action to take.  
 Other formulations of the PP do not make provisions for specific actions to be 
taken in order to operationalize the PP but they at least indicate considerations which 
should influence the choice of measures to be taken.  For example the Montreal Protocol 
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer34 states that economic and social factors 
should be considered when invoking the PP.  
 Similarly, the FCCC requires parties who seek to apply the PP to consider cost 
effective measures that take into account different socio-economic contexts. The FCCC 
also requires measures be comprehensive to cover all relevant sources, sinks and 
reservoirs of GHGs and to comprise all economic sectors.35  
 1. 4.4   Reversing the Burden of Proof 
 In some of its formulations, the PP places the burden of proving the harmlessness 
of a given behaviour on the party who wishes to engage in the behavior.36 This is often 
termed a reversal of the burden of proof. This policy is a departure from the traditional 
tort-oriented approach in which no harm is presumed to result from the activity of another 
until a party can demonstrate damage and causation.37 Without the reverse onus, parties 
accused of degrading the environment are allowed to proceed with an alleged 
environmentally degrading activity until it is established that such an activity is indeed 
                                                 
33Helsinki Convention on the Protection and Use of Trans boundary Watercourses and International Lakes: 
( Convention on the Protection and Use of Trans boundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Mar. 17, 
1992, 31 I.L.M. 1312, 1316) [“Helsinki Convention”]. 
34 See generally the preamble to Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 26 ILM 
1550 (1987) “Montreal Protocol”. 
35FCCC, supra note 1 at article 3. 
36David Vander Zwaag, “The Precautionary Principle in Environmental Law and Policy: Elusive Rhetoric 
and First Embraces’’ (1998) 8 J.E.L.P 355 at 359. 
37 See generally,   Allen M. Linden, Canadian Tort Law, (Ontario: Butterworths, 2001) 450-1. 
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 harmful to the environment.38 In other formulations, such as that adopted in the FCCC, 
there is no clear suggestion about shifting the burden of proof. Despite the absence of a 
lack of suggestion about burden of proof in some formulations of the PP, as soon as a risk 
of harm is identified by a person who wishes to engage in a behaviour, the onus should 
lie on the person who disputes the existence of the risk to prove otherwise if precaution is 
truly the goal. 
 An issue closely related to the burden of proof is the standard of proof. In the 
context of litigation, standards of proof reflect the degree of confidence which society 
places in the accuracy of factual conclusions by allocating the risk of error between the 
litigants.39 For example, in a criminal trial, the prosecution has the burden of proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant engaged in the prohibited wrongdoing with 
the state of mind, if any, specified in the definition of the offence. In civil proceedings, 
however, the standard of proof is on a balance of probabilities. As a result, the parties 
share the risk of error equally.  
 The standard of proof required to apply the PP in international environmental law 
depends on the formulation. Some formulations of the PP merely require the existence of 
a threat of damage to the environment.40 Other formulations of the PP for example in the 
context of climate change require that the threat of harm be serious or irreversible before 
the PP is invoked.  
 
 
                                                 
38J. Cameron & J. Abouchar, “The Precautionary Principle: A Fundamental Principle of Law and Policy for 
the Protection of the Global Environment”, (1991) 14 B.C Int’l &Comp. L. Rev. at 1 (the burden rests on 
the polluter on a balance of probabilities). 
39Ibid. 
40London Declaration,  supra note 7. 
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 1.5 Emergence of the PP in International Environmental Law 
 Despite the fact that the PP advances a progressive policy approach to 
environmental management, it is not a radical legal concept. Before its current popularity, 
international environmental law already addressed some aspects of the PP. For example, 
the preventative principle in international law obliges states to abstain from conduct 
which carries significant risk of reasonably foreseeable harm.41 As a result, the PP might 
be viewed as an extension of existing legal obligations. 
 The innovative quality of the PP, however, lies in the fact that it requires 
prevention not only in situations where there is significant risk of harm but also in 
circumstances where there is uncertainty whether harm will result. Also, unlike the 
preventative principle which requires risk and causation to be scientifically proven, the 
PP extends the preventative requirement where there is scientific uncertainty. It is 
therefore correct to say that the PP is different from preventative environmental policy 
because it requires action even if the threat of harm is uncertain.42  
 The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 
1972, which resulted in the passage of the Declaration on the Human Environment, (“the 
Declaration”)43 was probably the first official forum where the international community 
agreed that states are under a duty to prevent environmental harm from impacting their 
neighbours. Article 21 of the Declaration recognized the duty of states at international 
law to ‘‘ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to 
                                                 
41G. Handl, “Environmental Security and Global Change: The Challenge to International Law” (1990) 3 
Yearbook of International Environmental Law 22. 
42L Gundling,‘‘The Status in International Law of the Principle of Precautionary Action’’ (1990) 5 Int’l 
Journal of Estuarine and Coastal Law 23 at 26. 
43United Nations Declaration on the Human Environment, (1972) UN Doc.A/CONF.48/14, reproduced in 
(1972) 11 I.L.M.1416. See also, Simon Reeves, “French Nuclear Tests and the United Nations Conference 
on the Human Environment” (1973) 10 New Zealand Law Journal, 226. 
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 the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.’’ 
This declaration, which may be viewed as a precursor to the PP, can be interpreted to 
mean that states must act carefully so as to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction 
do not cause damage in other jurisdictions.  
 It was not until the late 1980s, however, that international legal circles witnessed 
the inclusion of the PP in a number of international treaties.44 Although earlier mention 
was made to precautionary measures in the Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer,45 statements of the Second International North Sea Conference 
in 1987 constitute the first true articulation of the PP in international environmental law. 
Ministers representing states that border the North Sea convened to limit the pollution of 
the North Sea. The final report of the conference stated: 
in order to protect the North Sea from possibly damaging effects of 
the most dangerous substances,… a precautionary approach is 
addressed which may require action to control inputs of such 
substances even before a causal link has been established by 
absolutely clear scientific evidence.46 
 
   The PP has since been incorporated into international agreements dealing with 
issues such as the control of trans-boundary movement of hazardous waste,47ozone layer 
depletion,48 biodiversity,49 and climate change.50  
                                                 
44Charmian Barton, ‘‘The Status of Precautionary Principle in Australia: It’s Emergence in Legislation and 
as a Common Law Doctrine’’ (1998) 22 Harvard Environmental Law Review 509. [Charmian Barton, “The 
Status of the Precautionary Principle in Australia”]. 
45Montreal Protocol, supra note 34. 
46London Declaration, supra note 7. A New Ministerial Declaration was delivered at the Third International 
Conference on the Protection of the North Sea. Ministerial Declaration  of the Third International 
Conference on the Protection of the North Sea, The Hague, Netherlands, March 8, 1990. Reprinted in 
Gunther Handl ed., (1990) 1 Yearbook of International Environmental Law [‘The Hague North Sea 
Declaration”]. 
47Bamako Convention on Hazardous Wastes Within Africa, Article 4,Jan. 30, 1991, 30 I.L.M 773.  
48Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, article 4. Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. at 1541 . 
49Convention on Biological Diversity, Preamble, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M 818. 
50FCCC, supra note 1 at article 3. 
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  As a result of its adoption in a number of international environmental instruments, 
the PP has been described as the most central principle in international environmental 
law.51 Also, international bodies have debated and endorsed the PP. An example of this is 
seen in the response to the threat of marine pollution at the fifteenth session of the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). The response from the session reads in part: 
…waiting for scientific proof regarding the impact of pollutants discharged into 
the marine environment may result in irreversible damage to the marine 
environment and in human suffering. [The Council] recommends that all 
governments adopt the principle of precautionary action as the basis of their 
policy with regard to prevention and elimination of marine pollution.52 
 
  According to some writers, the inclusion of the PP in a multitude of international 
instruments supports the conclusion that contemporary international law requires states to 
apply the PP.53 As noted its adoption by a number of states in domestic legislation has 
also been used as a basis for contending that the PP is now part of customary 
international law.54 Unfortunately, this may be an overstatement. While customary 
international law regarding the PP seems to be emerging and much progress appears to 
have been made at the international level regarding the application of the PP, the 
uncertainties in the meaning, application and implications of the PP make it difficult to 
                                                 
51Harald Hohmann, Precautionary Legal Duties and Principles of Modern International Environmental 
Law The Precautionary Principle: International Environmental Law. Between Exploitation and Protection, 
International Environmental Law and Policy Series (London: Graham & Trotman/ Martinus  Nijhoff, 
1994). 
52UNEP, “Precautionary Approach to Marine Pollution, Including Waste Dumping at Sea” UNEP 
Governing Council Decision15/27, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess,  Supp. No 25, at 17, U.N Doc A/44/25 (1989). 
53J. Cameron, “The Precautionary Principle- Core Meaning, Constitutional Framework and Procedures for 
Implementation”, Paper delivered at a conference on “The Precautionary Principle”, 20-21 September 
1993, Sydney, Institute of Environmental Studies, University of New South Wales.[J.Cameron, 
“Precautionary Principle-Core Meaning”]. 
54Arie Trouwburst, Evolution and Status of the Precautionary Principle supra  note 2 at 284. See also 
Philippe Sands, “The ‘‘Greening’’ of International Law: Emerging Principles and Rules” (1994) 1 Global 
Legal Studies Journal, 295.  
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 sustain the conclusion that the PP is a rule of customary international law.55 The 
articulation of the PP in treaties and other international documents, however, shows that 
the PP does have a legally important core on which there is international consensus. 
Consequently, states cannot rely on scientific uncertainty to justify inaction when there is 
a possibility of risk of harm. It needs to be noted that the last statement may be qualified 
in some contexts depending on the formulation of the PP. This is because in the context 
of climate change, states can argue that they will not apply the PP on grounds that such 
application will not be cost effective so as to ensure global benefit.  
1.6  Conclusion 
 The motive behind the PP is prevention of environmental harm before its 
occurrence. The importance of the PP can be appreciated in a context like climate change 
where countries are encouraged to join in a global effort to prevent or minimize the 
causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects.  
 As the discussion in the next chapter will show, the DR Principle is a means of 
encouraging countries to participate in international environmental agreements in order to 
prevent harm to the environment. Participation is sometimes achieved by exempting 
some countries from an obligation to protect the environment on grounds inter alia that 
such countries are not historically responsible for past environmental degradation. 
 
                                                 
55See generally, Government of Canada, “A Canadian Perspective on the Precautionary 
Approach/Principle-A Discussion Document” available  online at:  
http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/raoics-srdc/docs/precaution/Discussion/discussion_e.htm.(Last visited on 29th 
March 2005). (Owing to absence of clear evidence of uniform state practice and opinion juris, Canada does 
not yet consider the principle to be a rule of customary international law).  
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 2 The Differentiated Responsibility Principle in International 
Environmental Law 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 This chapter will discuss the history, development and meaning of the DR 
Principle in international environmental law with a view to laying a foundation that will 
be helpful in the subsequent sections of the thesis. The discussion on the history, the 
meaning, and the development of the DR Principle will show that the DR Principle was 
developed to address the persistent inequality among states. The theoretical basis for the 
DR Principle evinces its meaning and wider implications. The sub-section detailing the 
justifications for and against the DR Principle analyzes some of the arguments used by 
commentators in contending that the DR Principle should or should not be applied in 
international environmental law. 
2.2 History of the DR Principle in International Environmental Law 
 One of the fundamental principles of international law is the sovereign equality of 
states. Although this principle of sovereign equality lies at the root of international law, in 
practice, states are unequal in terms of technological advances, development, size, and 
population.1 These factors, coupled with the acknowledgement that formal equality may 
in some cases have undesirable results, have led to attempts to devise schemes to address 
situations where the equal treatment of states does not appear to bring about just 
                                                 
1Edith Brown Weiss, “The Emerging Structure of International Environmental Law”, in Norman J. Vig and 
Regina S. Axelrod eds., The Global Environment, Institutions, Law and Policy (Washington D.C: 
Congressional Quarterly, 1999) 98. 
 25
 outcomes.2 The differentiated responsibility principle (“DR Principle”), sometimes 
expressed as common but differentiated responsibility3 represents one such scheme. 
 The origin of the DR Principle in international environmental law can be traced to 
a number of new states that attained statehood following the end of the Second World 
War. These states urged the adoption of preferential treatment measures in order to 
mitigate some of the consequences of colonialism.4 The adoption of preferential 
treatment measures initially led to confrontation between developing and developed 
nations.5 Developed countries eventually accepted preferential treatment and have 
become increasingly more willing to reconsider the issue of preferential treatment of 
states.6  
                                                 
2Antonio Cassese, International Law in a Divided World (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986) 351[Hereinafter, 
Antonio Cassese, International Law]. 
3United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change “FCCC” Available online at: 
http://www.Unfcc.Default.asp.int. (Last visited on 10th September, 2004). The word “common” suggests 
that certain risks affect and are affected by every nation on earth. These include not only the climate change 
risks but all risks related to global public goods including peace, public health etc. Responsibilities are said 
to be differentiated in that not all countries can  contribute equally. Some nations ordinarily developed 
countries are charged with greater share of the burden than others, ordinarily the developing nations. See 
also Christopher D Stone, “Common But Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law” (2004) 98 
A.J.I.L 278. [Christopher D Stone, “Common But Differentiated Responsibilities”]. 
4Philippe Cullet, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law (London: Ashgate Publishing, 
2003) at 17. [Hereinafter Philippe Cullet, Differential Treatment.]The call was for the establishment of a 
new international economic order which is based on the notion of differential treatment. See generally, The 
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order G.A Res 320 1 (s-vi) 6 Special 
U.N GAOR Supp. (No.1) at 3 U.N Doc. A/9556 (1974).  The foregoing can be compared to the history of 
the DR Principle in international Law generally, see Christopher Stone, “Common But Differentiated 
Responsibilities in International Law” ibid (the practice of differentiating responsibilities in multilateral 
international agreements can be traced to the treaty of Versailles, (1919) in which the ILO recognized that 
differences of climate, habits and customs, economic opportunity  and industrial tradition make strict 
uniformity in conditions of labour difficult of immediate attainment).  See also the Constitution of the ILO, 
June 28, 1919, Art 427, 49 stat.2712, 2733-34, 225 Consol T.S.188, 385. The Programme of Action on the 
Establishment of  a  New International Economic Order G.A Res 3202 (s-vi), 6(special) UN GAOR Supp. 
(No. 31) at 50 U.N Doc A/9631(1974). The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States G.A Res. 
3281 (xxix), 29 U.N GAOR Supp. (No 31) at 50, U.N Doc A/9631 (1974) hereinafter “CERDS” Article 25 
of CERDS ( the  world community should  pay special attention to the needs and problems of the least 
developed among developing countries). Article 30 of CERDS (requires differential treatment in the 
context of state responsibility for protecting the environment). 
5R.St. J. McDonald, “Solidarity in Practice and Discourse of Public International Law” (1996) 8 Pace Int’l 
L.R. 259. 
6Ibid .See also, The Stockholm Declaration of the  United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 
(1972) available online at http://www.unep.org/Documents/Default.asp. (Last visited on  10th Sept 2004). 
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  Accordingly, the DR Principle emerged out of the desire to narrow the gap 
between developed and developing countries. It also arose from the acknowledgement 
that the peculiar circumstances of developing countries, namely, lack of sufficient 
technical expertise, regulatory and administrative efficacy, and economic capability, 
make it difficult, if not impossible, for them to comply with international environmental 
agreements in the same way as developed countries.7 Consequently, provisions based on 
the DR Principle are now included in international agreements.8  
2.3 Development of the DR Principle in International Environmental Law 
 The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment9 provided a forum for 
the international community to express its opinion on the DR Principle. At that 
conference, developing countries like India and China refused to be held to the same 
obligations with regard to environmental protection as developed countries because they 
felt that such obligations would unduly burden their economies. It should be noted that 
these developing countries are major sources of environmental degradation. China for 
example is the source of significant GHG emissions through its coal fired power plants. 
                                                                                                                                                 
[“Stockholm Declaration”]. Principle 23 therein contains a more generalized version of differential 
treatment. The declaration reflects the fact that different states have different values, the need to improve 
the standard of living in developing countries as well as the fact that developing countries face several 
disadvantages. See also, Philippe Cullet, Differential Treatment, supra note 4 at 17. 
7Stockholm Declaration,  supra   note 6 particularly principle 6 therein (the special situation and needs of 
developing countries, particularly the least developed and those most environmentally vulnerable shall be 
given special priority), see also, Philippe Sands, “International Law in the Field of Sustainable 
Development: Emerging Legal Principles” in Winifred Lang ed., Sustainable Development and 
International Law,(London: Graham & Trotman Ltd, 1995) 63-4 (Philippe Sands, International Law). 
Daniel Barstow Magraw, “Legal Treatment of Developing Countries: Differential, Contextual and Absolute 
Norms” (1990) 1 Colo J. Int’l Envt’l Law and Pol’y 69 at 70. (The idea behind the DR Priciple  is that 
developing countries need to channel the resources that they have towards remedying the domestic 
problems of poverty and disease. The governments of many developing countries are often in a state of 
rapid turmoil which prevents these countries from adequately addressing environmental concerns). 
8See for example, principles 6 and 12 of Stockholm Declaration, supra note 6 also available in U.N Doc. 
A/CONF.48/14 (1972).Reprinted in 11 ILM 1416 (1972). [United Nations Conference  on the Human 
Environment]. 
9Ibid.  
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 Furthermore, developing countries argued that it would be unjust to accept such a burden 
given that developed countries were historically responsible for past environmental 
degradation.10 Persuaded by this argument, the international community agreed that 
developing countries should receive differential treatment in international environmental 
agreements. Consequently, the Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference 
on the Human Environment adopted the DR Principle. Principle 12 of the Declaration 
issued pursuant to this conference provides:  
resources should be made available to preserve and improve the environment, 
taking into account the circumstances and particular requirements of 
developing countries and any costs which may emanate from their 
incorporating environmental safeguards into their development planning and 
the need for making available to them upon their request, additional 
international technical and financial assistance for this purpose.11 
 
Principle 23 of the same Declaration goes on to provide: 
without prejudice to such criteria as may be agreed upon by the international 
community or to standards which have to be determined nationally, it will be 
essential in all cases to consider the systems of values prevailing in each 
country and the extent of applicability of standards which are valid for the 
most advanced countries but which may be inappropriate and of unwarranted 
social cost for the developing countries.12 
 
Thus, the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment was the first forum 
wherein the application of the DR Principle to international environmental problems was 
recognized. 
 Consistent with the Stockholm Declaration, several ensuing multi-lateral 
environmental agreements began to differentiate between countries. For example, the 
                                                 
10Karl Ohlsen, Reviewing Anita M Halvorssen’s, “Equality Among Unequals in International 
Environmental Law:  Differential Treatment for Developing Countries” (2000) 11 Colo. J Envt’l L & Pol’y 
1 at 134.  
11Stockholm Declaration, supra note 6. 
12Ibid. 
 28
 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea13 (“UNCLOS”) requires parties to 
take into account the “circumstances and particular requirements of parties.”14 The 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer15 gives less developed 
countries grace periods for compliance with its provisions and establishes a fund to 
provide them with incremental costs of implementation.16 The DR Principle gained 
further prominence at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
in 199217which adopted the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(“FCCC”).18   
 An unambiguous adoption of the DR Principle by a multilateral international 
environmental agreement19 is contained in the FCCC, which provides that: 
the Parties should protect the climate system… on the basis of equity and in 
accordance with their ... differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities. 20 
                                                 
13The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, [“UNCLOS”] is permeated with special privileges 
for developing nations. See Preamble to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Oct 21, 
1982, U.N Doc A/CONF. 62/122, (1981) reprinted in 21 I.L.M 1261 (1982) (opened for signature, Dec 10, 
1982) see particularly Article 207(4) (in an endeavor to establish regional and global approaches, states 
shall take into account characteristic regional features, the economic capacity of developing states and their 
need for economic development). Article 202 (developed states to provide assistance to developing states) 
Article 203 (developing states shall be granted preference by international organizations in allocating funds 
and technical assistance and utilizing specialized services). 
14Ibid. at article 202. 
15The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer available online at:     
   http//www.unep.org/ozone/montreal-protocol/montreal-protocol2000.html. (Last visited on 10th     
   September, 2004).  
16Ibid. at  article 5.1. Monica Brookman, “Equality Among Unequals in International Environmental Law” 
(2000) 25 Columbia Journal of Environmental  Law, 369 at 373. [Monica Brookman,  “Equality Among 
Unequals in International Environmental Law”]at 376 . 
17Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, (Rio De Janeiro, 1992), 
available online at http://www.pdhre.org/conferences/rio.html. (Last visited, on 23rd May, 2005). 
18 FCCC, supra  note 3.  
19Although it is frequently applied in international environmental agreements that involve developed and 
developing countries the DR principle is not limited to such agreements only. It has also been applied to 
treaties and other international instruments that are solely applicable to developed countries. For example 
before its repeal, the E.E.C Large Combustion Directive No  88/609/EEC of 24th November 1988 on 
Limitation of Pollution of certain Pollutants into the Air from Large Combustion Plants, (Available online 
at http://europa.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc) (Last visited on 14th September, 2004). 
20FCCC, supra  note 3 at Article 3(1) See also principle 7 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development U.N Doc.A/CONF.151/5/Rev. 1(1992) reprinted in (1992)31 ILM 874. [“The Rio 
Declaration”].(States shall co-operate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore   the 
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Article 3(1) provides the premise for differentiated obligations of countries with regard to 
the duty to prevent climate change. 
         The DR Principle does not apply universally to all international environmental 
agreements. For example, it finds no place in treaties dealing with ultra-hazardous 
activities like nuclear safety,21 pollution from ships,22 regulation of dumping at sea,23 or 
trade in endangered species.24 It is not clear why differentiation is not provided for in 
these instruments but there are a number of possible explanations. First, some 
international environmental agreements are of such a nature that the purpose of the 
convention is defeated if exceptions to its provisions are allowed. For example in the 
Convention on Nuclear Safety,25 if a country were exempted from its mandatory 
provisions, the aim of the convention namely to legally commit participating states 
operating land-based nuclear power plants to maintain a high level of safety by setting 
international benchmarks to which States would subscribe, would be defeated because 
some countries will be exempted from this provision.26 Second, a number of influential 
                                                                                                                                                 
health and integrity of the earth’s ecosystem. In view of the different contributions to global environmental 
degradation, states have common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge 
the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the 
pressure their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial resources 
they command). Para 39.3(d) Agenda 21, available online at: .www.sovereignty.net/p/sd/a21 ( Last visited 
on 15th June, 2004). (States should when devising international standards, take into account, the different 
situations and capabilities of countries). 
21Convention on Nuclear Safety,Vienna, Sept 20,1994, available online at:  
http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/fulltext/infcirc/safety/safetext.html, (Last visited  on 8th November, 2004). 
22Convention on Prevention of Marine Pollution from Ships and Aircrafts, Oslo, Feb 15, 1972, available 
online at : http://sedac.ciesin.org/entric/texts/marine.pollution.dumping.ships.aircraft.html (Last visited  on 
8th Nov, 2004). 
23Ibid. 
24 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of wild Fauna and Flora, Washington D.C, 
March 3, 1973, (amended on 22nd June 1979), available online at: http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/text.shtml, 
(Last visited on 6th  November, 2004). 
25 Supra, note 21. 
26Convention on Nuclear Safety, supra  note 22 at article 1 (the Convention on Nuclear Safety  is aimed 
among other things at achieving and maintaining a high level of nuclear safety worldwide through the 
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 countries are opposed to the idea of differential treatment in certain contexts.27 As a result 
they oppose any attempt to impose the DR Principle in those instances.28 Third, 
international environmental agreements that have uniform obligations are probably less 
expensive to organize and enforce.29 
2.4 Meaning   of the DR Principle in International Environmental Law 
  The DR Principle is inconsistent with the idea that all parties undertaking a 
common activity should be subject to the same rules. It differentiates between countries 
in determining the degree of responsibility that a country has in addressing and 
remedying an environmental problem.30 It requires all states to participate in addressing 
environmental problems by adopting environmental standards, (commonality of 
responsibility) yet it provides for different obligations for countries taking into account 
factors such as their contributions to a particular environmental problem (differences in 
obligation).31 The DR Principle requires countries to recognize that because of peculiar 
circumstances, countries at different stages of development have different capacities and 
                                                                                                                                                 
enhancement of national measures and international co-operation including, where appropriate, safety-
related technical co-operation).  
27 For example, the United States of America is opposed to the idea of differential treatment which exempts 
developing countries from the obligation to restrict their GHG emissions See Letter to the Members of the 
US Senate on the Kyoto Protocol, (March 13, 2001) 37 Weekly Comp. Pres Doc 11 hereinafter “Bush’s 
Letter on Kyoto” also available online at: http//www.whitehouse.gov.(Last visited on 14th June, 2004). 
28See also, Christopher D Stone, “Common But Differentiated Responsibilities” supra note 4 at 283. 
29James E Krier, “On the Topology of Uniform Environmental Standards in Federal System and Why it 
Matters” (1995) 54 M.D.L Rev 1226 at 1230. 
30Daniel Magraw, “Legal Treatment of Developing Countries: Differential, Contextual and Absolute 
Norms”, (1990) 1 Co JIELP, 69. Daniel Magraw, “Legal Treatment of Developing Countries” 
(distinguishing different rules on DR Principle depending on the content). Lavanya Rajamani, “The 
Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility and the Balance of Commitments under the Climate 
Change Regime” (2000) 9 RECEIL 120. 
31Karin Mickelson, “South, North, International Environmental Law, and International Environmental 
Lawyers”, (2000) 11 Int’l Envt’l L.Y.B 52, at 79.[Karin Mickelson, “South, North, International 
Environmental Law and International Environmental Lawyers”]. (The DR Principle is a reflection of the 
pragmatic acceptance of, and response to, the fact of differing levels of financial and technological 
resources available to countries in different economic circumstances and an acknowledgement of the 
historic, moral, and legal responsibility of developed countries  to shoulder the burdens of environmental 
protection, just as it has enjoyed the benefits of economic and industrial development largely unconstrained 
by environmental concerns). 
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 inevitably different levels and kinds of responsibility for dealing with international 
environmental issues. As a result, it allows for flexibility in how different categories of 
states with different situations can address specific environmental threats. 
  To incorporate the DR Principle, a treaty will normally provide a general 
framework applicable to all countries that are bound by the treaty and thereafter 
differentiate as to the level of specific commitments. The basis for differentiation is often 
to encourage reluctant countries to agree to be bound by provisions of the treaty so as to 
achieve effective action on issues of common concern. For example developed countries 
may have commitments that are not imposed on developing countries.32 
 The DR Principle is manifested in other ways in international environmental law. 
For example, different groups of countries may be given different timetables to 
implement a common commitment.33 Treaties also include other DR mechanisms such as 
technology transfer and aid mechanisms, both of which serve to address the concerns of 
countries with less ability to implement the obligations imposed by the treaty.34 For 
example, the United Nations Convention on Biodiversity35 provides inter alia that “for the 
purposes of financing … consideration shall be given to the special situation of 
developing countries.”36  
                                                 
32FCCC, supra note 3 at article 3.  
33See Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, supra note 16, article 5.1 therein 
allows longer implementation periods in favor of countries for which compliance with the instrument is 
more cumbersome. 
34Ibid. 
3531 ILM 818. Opened for signature on 5th June 1992, [“CBD”] See also the Preamble to UNCLOS, supra  
note 13 for reference to “special interests and needs of developing countries.” 
36CBD, ibid at article 20(5). 
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 Sometimes, international environmental agreements do not expressly adopt the term 
“differentiated responsibility” but differentiate explicitly.37  
2.5 Some implications of the DR Principle in International Environmental Law 
 In affirming the common responsibility of developed and developing countries for 
environmental protection sometimes, higher standards are explicitly set for developed 
states.38 This practice is to encourage developing countries to commit to the idea of 
environmental responsibility. However, it implies that developed countries must assume a 
greater responsibility for environmental protection than developing countries. 
         Incorporating the DR Principle into international environmental law also requires 
developed countries to exercise leadership by example in an effort to prevent and/ or curb 
environmental pollution.39  
 The DR Principle can result in a situation of economic advantage to 
developing countries. Less demanding environmental obligations can encourage 
industries to relocate from developed countries to developing countries. The result may 
be job loss in developed countries and job creation in developing countries. 
                                                 
37UNCLOS, supra note 14. See Generally, Proceedings of the 96th Annual Meeting of the American 
Society of Int’l Law, March 16, 2002.“Common But Differentiated Responsibility” 2002 96 A.S.I.L 
Proceedings. (Remarks by Susan Biniaz).  
38FCCC, supra note 3, articles 4(1)a (b), 12, (For  differentiation of standards in respect of obligations 
expected of developed and developing states; developed countries are required to reduce their emission of 
GHGs, whereas developing countries are expected to take minor actions like creating inventories of their 
GHG emissions without being required to reduce their GHG emissions).  
39The leadership principle under the FCCC links differentiation of emission control obligations to the 
leadership principle. It requires that developed countries policies and measures should demonstrate that 
they are taking the lead in modifying longer term trends in anthropogenic emissions. See the FCCC supra 
note 3 at article 4(2)(a). For recognition of the financial and technological components of the leadership 
principle in the context of climate change see FCCC, supra note 3, article 4(3) and preamble thereto  
(Developed countries to provide technological and financial support to aid developing countries efforts to 
address environmental problems).The most developed countries must provide the “agreed full incremental 
cost” of developing country treaty compliance including funds for the transfer of technology. Note that the 
FCCC did not explain what is meant “by taking the lead” but the structure of the specific obligations which 
developed countries assumed under the FCCC shows that they should take the first steps in respect of 
efforts to combat climate change and this could be interpreted as a fulfillment of the leadership principle 
envisaged in the FCCC. See also, David M. Dreisen, “Free Lunch or Cheap Fix?: The Emissions Trading 
Idea and the Climate Change Convention” (1998) 26 B.C Envt’l Aff. L.R. 5. 
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  Unfortunately, the less demanding nature of environmental obligations 
imposed on developing countries by the DR Principle can also result in a situation 
whereby the economies of developing countries are encouraged to grow in an 
environmentally destructive direction causing their further environmental degradation. 
2.6 A Theoretical Basis for the DR Principle in International Environmental  Law 
      As noted, the principle of sovereign equality and the corresponding principle 
of legal equality of states are fundamental principles of international law.40 These 
principles make countries legally independent from other states although each is 
recognized as equal. Several consequences flow from this. First, at least in theory, all 
countries maintain their sovereign right to internal self-governance. Second, one could 
argue that since states are equal in international law, they should have the same 
obligations.41  
 In practice, however, owing to huge differences among states, international 
environmental agreements differentiate between countries in order to address the 
imbalance.42 Accordingly, one of the conceptual premises of the DR Principle in 
international environmental law is the existence of persistent differences in achievement 
between states. These differences also give rise to differential treatment.43 Since one of 
the justifications (at least in theory) for differential treatment is the need to promote 
equality between countries, it stands to reason that the DR Principle is influenced by 
                                                 
40Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 5th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998) 289. 
Antonio Cassese, International Law in a Divided World (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986) 351 
[Antonio Cassese, International Law]. 
41Michael Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules-International Relations and Customary 
International Law,(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 88. 
42Antonio Cassese, International Law, supra  note 40 at 43. 
43Cf  Devanesan Nesiah, Discrimination with Reason, The Policy of Reservations in the United Staes, India 
and Malaysia (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999) 7. 
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 equality concerns. Accordingly, a brief examination of the equality element of justice 
follows. 
2.7 Justice 
 
 Some scholars have noted the impact of justice on international environmental 
regimes. 44 As well, commentators argue that international environmental negotiations are 
based on considerations of justice.45 But what is justice? Justice has always been difficult 
to define and the promulgation of any definition is a task best left to philosophers. 46  
However, this does not presuppose that international environmental lawyers are unable to 
inform their analysis with a working definition of the term. Consequently, this thesis 
adopts a broad understanding of the concept. Justice results when subjects of the law are 
treated in a similar fashion.47 Based on the foregoing definition, it can be argued that the 
interest of justice would be served when countries have the same the benefits and burdens 
with regard to protection of the global environment.  
 Two consequences result from the foregoing proposition. First, states are posited 
as base units among which the benefits and burdens are to be allocated. This entails 
elevating traditional justice theory, which classifies individuals as the base units, to the 
level of interstate relations in which states constitute the base units and actors for 
counting benefits and burdens. Second, given that a crucial element of justice is 
                                                 
44For example, Paul Harris notes that “Considerations of  international justice have been important parts of 
international environmental negotiations over the last twenty-odd years……provisions for Justice in 
conventions(eg. FCCC) include calls for new and additional funds and technology transfers on preferential 
terms to help developing countries develop in a sustainable fashion”. See Paul G Harris, “What is Fair?; 
International Justice from  an Environmental Perspective” available online at:  
http//www.ciaonet.org/isa/hap01.html (Last Visited, April 2, 2004),[Paul G Harris, “What is Fair?; 
International Justice from  an Environmental Perspective”]. 
45Karin Mickelson, “Rhetoric and Rage: Third World Voices in International Legal Discourse”, (1998) 16 
Wis. Int’l L.J, 397. 
46See generally Dennis Lloyd, The Idea of Law,(Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1981) at 117 [Dennis Lloyd, 
The Idea of Law] ( Justice can be described as a moral value and one of the aims which man seeks to 
achieve in order to attain a good life).  
47Ibid. 
 35
 “equality,” it is necessary to explore the types of equality in order to relate them to the 
DR Principle and determine which of them might be just.  
 The foregoing analysis leads to an important divide in justice theory between 
those who promote formal equality (equality of opportunity) as a just result on the one 
hand and those who promote substantive equality (equality of result) on the other hand.  
2.7.1 Formal Equality as Justice 
 Formal equality posits that all subjects of the law should be treated in a similar 
fashion.  This view of equality was stated in Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics (Book 
V).48 Formal equality treats every person who is classified as belonging to the same 
category for a particular purpose the same way.49 It supports the application of rules on 
all subjects of the law in an unambiguous, identical fashion regardless of the outcome to 
individual subjects of the law. For example, if the right to vote at the United Nations 
General Assembly (“UN”) is extended to all sovereign states which became independent 
before the formation of the body, the theory requires that all such states be equally 
entitled to the exercise of this voting right. Justice is not infringed by the exclusion of 
states which became independent after the formation of the UN from the list of voters, 
regardless of their status as states.  
 Formal equality theorists classify all sovereign states as being of equal worth.50 
They generally view as just a system in which all states are treated as equals. 
Accordingly, unequal treatment for any reason is unjustified. Based on formal equality, 
                                                 
48St Thomas  Aquinas, Commentary on the Nichomachean Ethics Vol.1trans. by C.I Litzinger, O.P,  
(Chicago: Henry Regnery Company,1964) at 381-2.[ St Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on  Nichomachean 
Ethics]. 
49Ibid. at 119. It should be noted that there are differences among approaches to formal justice. These 
differences often relate to the extent to which rules are to apply equally to all without distinction. For 
example, rules can be applied in unambiguously identical fashion to all regardless of the outcome of those 
rules to individual subjects of the law. 
50Ibid. 
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 all countries would be subjected to the same standards of compliance in respect of their 
obligation to protect the environment.  
 It is important to note, however, that formal equality is not a principle without 
qualification. It requires equality of treatment according to the classification stipulated in 
the rules. The UN example provided above illustrates this point in that the classification 
distinguishes between states that existed at the time the UN was created and those that 
emerged afterwards. 
 Formal equality theory is often attacked on grounds that it is unrealistic, 
impracticable, and cannot serve as a sufficient principle of justice because it is simply a 
condition for consistent application of any idea or rule.51 Critics also say that formal 
equality does not often produce good results because of significant differences in 
characteristics and circumstances of individuals and groups.52  
2.7.2 Substantive Equality as Justice 
 Philosophers who view formal equality as unjust espouse a different theory of 
justice. Substantive equality permits unequal treatment to the extent needed to achieve an 
equal overall result.53 Advocates of substantive equality demand that rules take into 
account the differences among countries in order to avoid outcomes that are considered 
unfair.54 Applied in the context of international environmental law, substantive equality 
supports the proposition that states need to be treated differently in order to attain the 
more important purpose: a more equal, just and equitably ordered world. 
                                                 
51Ibid. at 119-120. 
52Ibid. 
53 Dennis Lloyd, The Idea of Law, supra note 46, 122-3. 
54 Ibid. 
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  Substantive equality is not a single theory but several theories that reflect the 
multiple types and sources of difference and a number of alternative or overlapping 
substantive ideals. One version of substantive equality allows for differentiation of 
responsibility among individuals in order to remedy the effect of past injustice.55 In the 
context of inter-state relations in international environmental law, substantive equality 
looks beyond the issue of differentiation of responsibility and calls for financial 
assistance and technology transfer to developing states in order to aid their developmental 
efforts. The aim of each substantive equality approach is to allow for differentiation 
among countries that would ordinarily be treated as equals. 
2.7.3 The DR Principle and Equality Theory 
 The DR Principle as applied in international environmental law is at cross-
purposes with the notion of formal equality. This is because, unlike formal equality, 
which treats all countries in a similar fashion, the DR Principle treats countries differently 
by providing for different standards of compliance in respect to the obligation to protect 
the environment.  
 It is arguable in the context of international environmental law, that the DR 
Principle does achieve substantive equality between developing and developed states.56 
This is because substantive equality takes into account the differences among countries 
before allocating unequal responsibilities to them.  
 In some cases, it is important that formal equality be applied to countries in 
international environmental law. The example from the Convention on Nuclear Safety 
                                                 
55Ibid. 
56See also, Philippe Cullet, “Differential Treatment in International Law:Towards a New Paradigm of Inter-
State Relations” (1999) 10 Eur. J. International Law 549 at 551 (differential treatment seeks to foster 
substantive equality in the international community).  
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 provided above illustrates this point. If some countries are exempted from the obligation 
to maintain a high level of nuclear safety through inter alia national measures, 
international co-operation, and ultimately safety related co-operation, the objective of the 
Convention will not be realized.  
 However, the importance of substantive equality in international environmental 
law cannot be over- emphasized. If formal equality is applied in all circumstances, the 
result will be undesirable. For example, if developing countries are required to commit to 
the same standard of environmental protection as developed countries and not encouraged 
to do so through incentives such as financial/technical assistance from developed 
countries, developing countries may never be in a position to meet these standards. In 
such an event, efforts by developed countries to protect the environment will be frustrated 
by environmental degradation that emanates from developing countries.57Given this, 
obligations that are imposed upon countries with regard to environmental protection 
should be referable to the desired outcomes.58 There must be some role for factoring in 
overall outcomes when apportioning these obligations. Accordingly, the decision as to 
whether or not to apply formal or substantive equality in an international environmental 
agreement should only be made after considering the effect that the decision will have on 
the desired outcome from such agreement. 
 In the context of climate change, a DR Principle that aims to achieve the goal of 
climate change prevention/mitigation must consider the special circumstances of 
countries before allocating responsibilities to them in such a way as not to cause climate 
                                                 
57See generally, Anita Margrethe Halvorssen, Equality Among Unequals in International Environmental 
Law, Differential Treatment for Developing Countries (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999) at 3-4 and 28. 
(Discussing how equal treatment of countries differs from equitable treatment). 
58Case concerning the Continental Shelf, (Tunis/Libya), 1982 ICJ 18, 60 Para 71. (On the relationship 
between justice, equality and equity in international law). 
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 change. This presupposes that such peculiar circumstances will justify an application of 
substantive equality in respect of efforts to prevent climate change. However, it will be a 
contradiction in terms if application of substantive equality leads to climate change. As a 
result, any application of the DR Principle, which exacerbates climate change, ought to 
be abandoned. However, those aspects of the DR Principle, such as the promise of 
financial assistance, technology transfer, debt forgiveness, which encourage countries to 
join in global efforts to prevent climate change, ought to be embraced.  
2.8 Justifications for and against the DR Principle in International   
 Environmental Law 
  Some commentators argue that the DR Principle creates “new problems in 
defining general state obligations in international environmental law.”59 Because 
differentiation is based on the classification of states as developed and developing, any 
problems in this classification process makes it impossible to apportion obligations 
between countries. As a result of this difficulty, some commentators say that differential 
treatment of developing countries should be restricted to the provision of financial and 
technical assistance and that none of those preferences should decrease the standard of 
care that is expected from a developing state with respect to the environment.60 Protection 
of the environment is crucial and no country should be exempted from the standard of 
care expected in this regard. 
                                                 
59Hans Christian  Bugge, “International Environmental Law-Status and Challenges in Erling Selvig & Hans 
Christian Bugge eds., International Environmental Law  (Oslo:Juridsk Forlag, 1995) at 59. Other critics 
argue that the DR Principle jeopardizes the very purpose of international environmental law see for 
example Gunther Handl, “Environmental Security and Global Change: The Challenge to International 
Law”( 1990) 1 Y.I.E.L 10. (The dilution of normative demands on developing countries is likely to impede 
progress by those countries towards an adequate level local environmental protection, the acquisition of 
technological know-how and managerial ability on which sustainable development locally will depend). 
60See generally, Daniel Barstow Magraw, “The International Law Commission’s Study of International  
Liability for Non-Prohibited Acts as it Relates to Developing States” (1986) 61 Wash. L. Rev 1041 at 1054. 
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  Another view argues that regardless of how serious environmental degradation 
currently is, because the developed states created the problems through their past 
industrial activities, they should be held responsible for remedying the problem. In other 
words, developing states should have an equal opportunity to pollute the environment 
before they are required to comply with environmental regulation.61 The commentators 
who support this view also say that the DR Principle should be encouraged in view of the 
disincentives that developing countries face (eg that such agreements would curtail their 
development) when persuaded to agree to be bound by international environmental 
agreements.62 
 Accordingly, the debate on applicability of the DR Principle in international 
environmental law has tended to converge on its merits and demerits. However, 
commentators who argue in favour of its application are also concerned about the nature 
of obligations that should be imposed on developing countries.  
 A resolution of the issue as to applicability or otherwise of the DR Principle in 
international environmental law is important for at least two reasons. First, while it is 
generally agreed that developed countries played a major role in creating environmental 
problems,63 there is also the opinion that such developed countries cannot protect the 
environment by their efforts alone.64 Second, a number of developing countries are 
growing rapidly and such development will likely result in a situation whereby their own 
                                                 
61See generally, Fredrick C Stein, “Economic Implications of Trans frontier Pollution: National Prerogative 
and Attribution of Responsibility” (1986) 11 G.A J. Int’l & Comp L 519  at 536.Also Daniel Barstow 
Magraw, “The International Law Commission’s Study of International Liability for Non-Prohibited Acts as 
it Relates to Developing States” (1986) 61 Wash. L. Rev 1041 at 1054. (Developed countries are the true 
source of environmental damage because they consume much more resources than developing countries). 
See also Daniel Magraw, “Legal Treatment of Developing Countries: Differential, Contextual and Absolute 
Norms”, (1990) 1 Co JIELP  69. 
62Ibid. See also section 2.8.2.4 below. 
63Ibid. 
64Ibid. 
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 environmental degradation may surpass the pollution already caused by developed 
countries.65 
2.8.2.1 The Historical Culpability of Developed Countries for Past Environmental 
 Degradation 
 Historical culpability is arguably the most obvious reason for the existence of the 
DR Principle in international environmental law. It asserts that the responsibility for 
remedying an environmental problem should be assumed by those states that created the 
problem in the first place. Accordingly, since developed countries have historically been 
the ones exploiting the earth’s resources and almost single handedly contributed to the 
current environmental degradation problems, they should be most responsible for solving 
it.66 Likewise, since developing countries do not have the same historical culpability as 
developed countries, they should not shoulder as much burden as developed countries. 
Historical culpability is a form of compensation for historically accumulated ecological 
debts: industrialized countries should be blamed for the ecological damage they caused 
outside their territories and for their over-use of the ecosystem goods and services. It is 
arguable that historical responsibility is a variant of corrective justice because it seeks to 
                                                 
65Ibid. 
66S Chowdhury, “Common But Differentiated Responsibility in International Environmental Law: From   
Stockholm (1972) to Rio (1992)” in K. Gunther et al (eds.,), Sustainable Development and Good 
Governance (London  Boston: Graham Trotman/M. Nijhoff, 1995) at 32-33. (Contribution to global 
environmental degradation being unequal, responsibility……..has to be unequal and commensurate with 
the differential contribution to such degradation). See also Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury eds., 
The International Politics of the Environment (Oxford, Oxford University Press,1991) at 39. [Hurrel and 
Kingsbury, International Politics of the Environment]  (as principal beneficiaries of past emissions, 
developed states should bear a disproportionate share of the costs). See also Anita M. Halvorssen,  Equality 
Among Unequals in International Environmnetal Law: Differential Treatment for Developing Countries 
(Colorado:Westview Press, 1999) at 28. (The DR principle allows for exceptions in the name of fairness or 
reasonableness, “…since industrialized countries have done most of the polluting, it is only fair that 
developing countries be given leeway in environmental control measures.”) 
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 remedy harms that have been suffered in the past.67 It is also a means of achieving 
substantive equality among states. 
  Differentiated responsibility based on historical culpability requires 
leadership from developed countries.68 However, it proves difficult to apply in practice. It 
is often difficult for an international agreement to truly reflect the contribution of an 
individual state or group of states to an environmental problem.69  
  In addition, the consequences of culpability theory in some international 
environmental agreements (for example, agreements relating to climate change) support 
its rejection. First, notwithstanding moral culpability, it is at cross purposes to allow one 
segment of the international community to continue to be involved in an activity which 
leads to environmental consequences that other members should be striving to avoid. 
Second, the historical culpability theory assumes that compliance by developed countries 
alone would be sufficient to prevent environmental degradation. Such an assumption flies 
in the face of available evidence. Environmental degradation by developing countries 
continues to increase substantially;70 future forecasts show significant increases in 
environmental degradation by developing countries, which are projected to equal or 
exceed that of developed countries.71 Does it make sense to allow the possibility of 
exacerbation of environmental degradation on grounds that developed countries alone 
                                                 
67Christopher D Stone, The Gnat is Older than the Man: Global Environment and Human Agenda (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993) at 250. 
68Hurrell and Kingsbury, International Politics of the Environment, supra  note 66 at 39. 
69 Ibid. 
70Energy: Carbon Emissions Predicted to Increase Substantially by 2020, DOE Report Says (April 29, 
1998) 21 Int’l Envt’l Rep (BNA) 439. 
71Mark A Drumbl, “Does Sharing Know its Limits? Thoughts on Implementing International 
Environmental Agreements: A Review of National Environmental Policies, A Comparative Study of 
Capacity Building” (1999) 18 Va. Envt’l L.J 281 at  286. 
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 should fix the problem?72 From the point of view of environmental protection, the answer 
must be no. The climate is a shared resource that should be preserved for present and 
future generations. 
 Another problem with the culpability theory is that it does not permit the 
application of the PP in international environmental law. The culpability theory only 
apportions liability for past environmental degradation. As a result, it does not seek to 
prevent environmental harm before its occurrence.   
 Furthermore, the historical culpability theory focuses only on historical 
responsibility without addressing conceptual responsibility. Conceptual responsibility 
sets out the general principle that responsibility is dependent upon a state’s ongoing as 
well as historic contribution to environmental problems. Conceptual responsibility leaves 
open the possibility for developing countries to assume a greater responsibility for 
environmental damage as their contributions to the problem increase. Conceptual 
responsibility is important because with developing states having an increasing 
population, greater landmass, and more development, the potential for them to cause 
damage to the environment is very high.73  Conceptual responsibility has the flexibility to 
assign obligations to developing countries as their contributions to environmental 
degradation increase. 
          Applied in the context of climate change, conceptual responsibility would justify a 
DR Principle that sees all countries sharing some responsibility for climate change. This 
                                                 
72Richard N Cooper, “Toward a Real Global Warming Treaty” (March/ April 1998) 77 Foreign Affairs 66, 
68-69. 
73For example, one study concluded that between 1800-1900, the developed countries cumulatively 
accounted for over 84% of all carbon dioxide emissions caused by fossil fuel burning and over 75% of 
carbon dioxide associated with deforestation, See  Anup Shah, “Climate Justice and Equity” available 
online http/www.global issues.org/envissues/globalwarming/justice_asp. (Last visited on 17th March, 
2004).  See also preamble and article 3(1) of FCCC, supra note 3. 
 44
 conceptualization of the DR Principle does not re-assign liability for climate change away 
from developed countries to developing countries. Instead, the responsibilities of 
developing countries increase over time in relation to their culpability. Unfortunately, the 
current articulation of the DR Principle in the FCCC and the Protocol assigns no liability 
to developing countries in the short term. We have yet to see whether this will change in 
the long run. 
2.8.2.2 The Capability of Developed Countries to Remedy Environmental Damage 
 Another basis used by commentators to justify the application of the DR Principle 
in international environmental law is the capability theory. According to this theory, it is 
fair to consider who has the resources to address an environmental problem before 
apportioning liability. This theory recognizes that in practice, developing countries are 
often so pre-occupied with immediate, local environmental concerns, such as safe 
drinking water, providing arable land, indoor air quality and surging population, that they 
do not have the resources to bear the direct costs associated with attaining the abatement 
standards that are central to many multilateral environmental agreements.74   
 Accordingly, the ability of countries to respond to environmental problems is not 
equal. Countries that have the capacity to respond to environmental problems should take 
the lead. Afterall, the global environment is a shared resource that ought to be managed 
for the wealth and welfare of all the people of the earth. Developed countries have the 
technology, the expertise, and financial might to tackle environmental degradation 
                                                 
74Mark A Drumbl “Northern Economic Obligation, Southern Moral Entitlement and International 
Environmental Governance” (2002) 27 Colum. J. Envt’l L 363. See also, Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration, 
supra note 20. 
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 problems while many developing countries do not have these resources at their disposal.75 
Developed countries are most able to protect the environment, thus they should assume 
the lion’s share of responsibility to do so.76  
 As with differentiation based on a state’s contribution to an environmental 
damage, differentiation based on capabilities can either be interpreted literally, requiring 
individual developed states to assume responsibility for environmental protection based 
on their capabilities, or it can be interpreted more widely so as to impose additional 
obligations on all developed states on grounds that based on their status as developed 
states, they have the capability to meet these obligations. The former appears to be a 
better interpretation. This is because the responsibility of countries for environmental 
protection should also be referable to the capability of the countries concerned.  
2.8.2.3 Special Needs and Circumstances of Developing Countries 
 Another reason used to justify the DR Principle in international environmental 
law is that the international community should consider the special needs and 
circumstances of developing countries. This notion was recognized in the Rio 
Declaration as a relevant concept for future development of international environmental 
                                                 
75See generally, Lynne M. Jurgielewicz, Global Environmental Change and International Law: Prospects 
for Change in the Legal Order (Maryland: University Press of America, 1996) at 142-143.This position has 
been recognized in some international environmental law regimes. For example the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer recognized that developed countries have the financial ability to 
assist developing countries in their compliance with CFC reduction. This economic ability partially 
justified the creation of an international economic fund to help the developing countries reach the protocols 
goals. See Monica Brookman, “Equality Among Unequals in International Environmental Law” ” (2000) 
25  Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 369 at 373. [Monica Brookman, “Equality Among Unequals 
in International Environmental Law”]. 
76Cheng Zheng-Khang, ‘‘ Equity, Special Considerations, and the third World’’(1990)1 Colombia Journal 
of International Environmental Law &Policy 57, [Cheng Zheng-Khang, ‘‘Equity, Special Considerations’’] 
Daniel Magraw, “Legal Treatment of Developing Countries: Differential, Contextual and Absolute Norms” 
(1990) I Colo J Int’l Envt’l L& Pol’y 69. See also Preamble to FCCC, supra note 3 (that the climate system  
should be protected  by the parties in accordance with their respective capabilities.). Lynne M. 
Jurgielewicz, Global Environmental Change and International Law: Prospects for Change in the Legal 
Order, ibid at 142-143. See also, Daniel Bodansky, “Managing Climate Change” (1992) 3 YIEL 68. 
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 law.77 Unlike responsibility and capability assumptions, this justification for the DR 
Principle is premised on the recognition that providing an effective response to global 
environmental problems is not a priority of the developing countries.78As a result, 
obligations contained within some multilateral environmental agreements are 
differentiated.79 
 At times, differentiation based on responsibility could come into conflict with 
differentiation based on the need to consider the special circumstances of developing 
countries. This arises if the contribution of developing states to global environmental 
problems increases significantly and such countries remain in poorer socio-economic 
conditions than developed states. In such a case, a literal interpretation of differentiation 
based on responsibility for environmental damage suggests that developing states 
undertake some of those obligations previously undertaken by developed states. 
Differentiation based on the special circumstances of developing states alone will not 
look at the increased impact of activities from such countries, but rather at whether such 
countries still require preferential treatment because of their socio-economic status.  
 A reconciliation of this conflict should be based on the need to protect the 
environment. A developing country should not be exempted from a duty to protect the 
                                                 
77Principle 6 of The Rio Declaration, supra  note 20 which notes inter alia  “… the special situation and 
needs of developing  countries…should be given special priority.”   
78See for example the 21st preambular paragraph to the FCCC, supra note 3 which states that    
      “attaining sustainable economic growth and the eradication of poverty are the legitimate priority needs      
      of the developing parties.” 
79See Principle 6 of the Rio Declaration, supra note 20.Also, U.N Doc. E/CN.17/1997/8: Report of  the Sec 
Gen :Rio Declaration on Environment and Development: Application and Implementation (10th Feb 1997) 
Particularly Para 40 : 
     …the principle of special treatment of developing countries finds its elaboration in  the recognition of        
     differentiated responsibilities among countries, also principle 11 of the Rio Declaration 
     ..states shall enact effective environmental legislation. Environmental standards, management     
     objectives and priorities should reflect the environmental and developmental context to which they      
     apply. Standards applied by some countries may be inappropriate and of unwarranted economic and   
     social cost to other countries particularly developing countries. 
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 environment merely because of its special circumstance as a developing country. 
However, such special circumstances do justify an argument that developed countries 
should provide financial and or technical assistance to such a developing country to aid it 
in an effort to protect the environment from harm. The need to protect the environment is 
compelling because the international community is presently at a point where the 
environment may no longer be able to absorb further replication of past patterns of 
environmental degradation. 
2.8.2.4 The DR Principle as an Incentive to Developing Countries 
 The existence of the DR Principle in international environmental law is often 
promoted on grounds that it provides an inducement to developing countries to 
participate in multilateral environmental agreements.80 Proponents of the DR Principle 
argue that developing states often see very little immediate benefit in agreeing to 
environmental obligations. As a result, they often refrain from ratifying these agreements. 
However, by making provision for less demanding obligations and providing incentives 
such as technical transfers etc to developing countries, the DR Principle promotes 
ratification and compliance with international environmental agreements by developing 
countries. This helps to support universal participation. 
 Universal participation is crucial to the efficacy of most international 
environmental agreements.81 Accordingly, in order to encourage developing countries to 
participate in such agreements, the developed countries must offer many forms of 
                                                 
80Anita Margrethe Halvorssen, Equality Among Unequals in International Environmental Law, Differential    
   Treatment for Developing Countries, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999) 4, [Anita Margrethe Halvorssen,    
   Equality Among Unequals in International Environmental Law]. (The Montreal Protocol on substances  
   that deplete the ozone layer, demonstrates the extent to which the use of differential responsibilities can   
   promote universal participation in view of the fact that most developing countries in addition to  
   developed ones have joined the Protocol). 
81Monica Brookman, “Equality Among Unequals in International Environmental Law” supra note 75 at   
   377.  
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 incentives including the transfer of financial resources, environmentally sound 
technology and technical aid programs.82 
 The need for broad participation in international environmental regimes is 
comparable to a general proactive approach of harm avoidance. What is being sought is 
the protection of the environment by avoiding potential and uncertain harm. This 
resembles the PP in that the international community does not need scientific certainty 
before taking action to protect the environment from harm. Accordingly, an argument can 
be made that a broad objective of the DR Principle is to promote the PP. The DR 
Principle permits developing countries to adopt environmental treaties more quickly and 
avoid an environmental harm before its occurrence.83  
2.9 The DR Principle and the Notion of Formal and Substantive Equality 
 Can it be said that the DR Principle in international environmental law promotes 
formal or substantive equality between countries? Given that the DR Principle favours a 
situation whereby countries are not treated in a similar fashion, prima facie it promotes 
substantive equality between countries only if the result is equitable. However, this 
comment requires closer analysis, especially as some justifications for the DR Principle 
in international environmental law involves efficiency and equitable concerns regarding 
environmental protection. 
 As for efficiency, the core issue is whether developing countries are in a position 
to protect the environment in a consistent and satisfactory manner. If not, what use is 
there in delegating them the responsibility? As a result, the capability theory advocates 
                                                 
82See generally, Anita M. Halvorssen,  Equality Among Unequals supra  note 80 at  2-3. 
83Mark A. Drumbl, “Poverty, Wealth and Obligation in International Environmental Law” (2002) 76   
   Tulane Law Review 922. 
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 substantive equality between countries because it contemplates a situation whereby 
developing countries are not treated in a similar fashion as developed ones.  
 On the other hand, as an incentive to encourage developing countries to 
participate in international environmental agreements, the DR Principle could have the 
perverse effect of encouraging environmentally unfriendly behaviour among developing 
countries. Accordingly, pinning hopes on the use of exemptions as an incentive to 
encourage developing countries to participate in international environmental regimes may 
be misplaced.84 However, substantive equality needs to be applied so as to encourage 
developing countries to participate in international environmental agreements including 
the FCCC and the Protocol. This can be achieved by means of financial and technical 
assistance programs instead of their outright exemption from the obligation to protect the 
environment. The level of assistance need not necessarily be based on the fact that 
activities from these countries are a threat to the environment. If this were the case, the 
PP could be ignored because countries that do not threaten the environment would be 
excluded. The level of assistance should be based on foreseeable harm from developing 
countries.  
 Application of the DR Principle solely on grounds of historical culpability and 
special needs and circumstances will also promote substantive equality among countries 
but it will have the unfortunate effect of discouraging developing countries from 
undertaking substantive environmental control measures. The relevance of this 
observation is underscored by the fact that concerns regarding the compliance of 
developing countries with their obligation to protect the environment are central to the 
                                                 
84Mark A Drumbl, “Does Sharing Know its Limits? Thoughts on Implementing International 
Environmental Agreements: A Review of National Environmental Policies, A Comparative Study of 
Capacity Building” (1999) 18 Va Envt’l L.J. 281. 
 50
 success or failure of most international environmental regimes. Consequently, the DR 
Principle should be applied in international environmental law in a manner that would 
also protect the environment from harm. 
2.10 Conclusion 
 There are several justifications for the application of the DR Principle in international 
environmental law. However, the aspect of the DR Principle which exempts some 
countries from commitments to protect the environment for whatever reason, needs to be 
re-examined in international environmental agreements including agreements relating to 
climate change. It is true that these exemptions can be used to achieve formal equality 
among developing countries. The exemptions can also result in substantive equality 
among developed and developing countries but they could have profound negative 
consequences on the environment resulting in a situation whereby the purpose of the 
agreement will not be realized. 
 
 
 51
 3     The PP and the DR Principle in Practice: The Case of Climate Change 
3.1 Introduction 
 The basis of the analysis in this chapter is to show that in some cases some 
aspects of the DR Principle do not promote the aims of the PP. Climate Change is used as 
a case study. The discussion on the meaning and severity of climate change, outlines the 
debate by scientists on the issue, and lends credence to the need to apply the PP to 
climate change. 
 The discussion on international action on climate change is an overview of the 
international response to the threat. It also reviewed the PP and the DR provisions in the 
FCCC and the Protocol. The aim of this discussion is to support the argument that some 
aspects of the DR Principle in the FCCC and Protocol are in conflict with the PP. 
3.2 Meaning of Climate Change 
Climate change refers to a variety of complex climatic changes that accompany an 
increase in the concentration of certain gases in the atmosphere known as greenhouse 
gases (“GHGs”). These gases are: water vapour, methane, chloro-fluorocarbons, carbon 
dioxide and nitrous oxide.1  GHGs enable the earth to trap infrared radiation, which 
warms surface temperatures while at the same time permitting excess heat to escape. The 
earth must radiate energy away in an amount equal to that absorbed from the sun, if the 
surface temperature is to remain in balance.2 GHGs at their natural level maintain such a 
                                                 
1See generally, Durwood Zaelke & James Cameron, “Global Warming and Climate Change, An Overview 
of the International Legal Process”(1989-1990) 5 Am. U. J. Int’l L. & Pol’Y 249. For a good scholarly 
discourse on the meaning of global warming as well as the scientific controversies about the likelihood of 
its occurrence, see, Daniel B.Botkin, “Global Warming: What It Is, What Is Controversial About It, and 
What We Might Do in Response to It” (1990-1991) 9 UCLA J.Envt’l L.&Pol’Y 123.  
2Stephen H. Schneider, “The Greenhouse Effect: Science and Policy”, (1989) 243 Sci.771. [Stephen H. 
Schneider, “The Greenhouse Effect”]. 
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 balance.3 When there is an increase in the atmospheric concentration of GHGs, the earth 
receives slightly more energy than it radiates into space and this results in a rise in the 
temperature at the earth’s surface leading to climate change.4  
The threat of climate change poses enormous challenges to the international 
community because if no action is taken to prevent it, global temperatures and sea levels 
may rise resulting in adverse consequences to the environment.5 Other potential adverse 
effects of climate change include increased desertification, meteorological instability, 
departure from historic agricultural conditions in many parts of the world, increased 
rainfall leading to increased pollution due to run off, as well as increased instances of 
heat stress leading to human respiratory illness in many nations.6  
 Some scientists have expressed growing concern about unusually warm 
temperatures and extreme weather events attributable to the increasing output of carbon 
dioxide and other GHGs into the atmosphere.7 However, the scientific community does 
not unanimously accept that human induced climate change is occurring. Some scientists 
still doubt the existence of climate change, arguing that changes witnessed in the climatic 
patterns are normal fluctuations.8 Opinion has also been expressed that the extent and 
                                                 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid. 
5For an authoritative treatment of climate change science, effects and policy options, see, 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2001, 3 Vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001).David Boyd, Unnatural Law, Rethinking Canadian Environmental Law and Policy (Vancouver: 
UBC Press 2003) 83-4. [D. Boyd, Unnatural Law]. 
6Daniel Bodansky, ‘‘The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary’’ 
(1993) 18 Yale Journal of International Law 458-62 [D. Bodansky, ‘‘Commentary’’]. 
Andrew C. Revkin, “Artic Perils Seen in Warming” available online at: 
http://ww.nytimes.com/2004/10/30/science/earth/30artic.html, (Last visited on 5th January, 2005) 
7Stephen H. Schneider, “The Greenhouse Effect” supra note 2. 
8Fred Singer, “The Global Warming Debate: A Treaty Built in the Air .Not Scientific Consensus,” Wall 
Street Journal 25th July 1997 A14 (Arguing that global warming is mostly a “phantom problem”).  
See generally, Tamara L.Harswick “2002 Yearbook: Comment: Developments in Climate Change”, (2002) 
Colo.  J. Int’l  Envtl L & Pol’y 25 ( the international community continued to debate the existence of 
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 impact of climate change is not as severe and serious as some scientists want us to 
believe.9 However, the vast majority of the world’s scientists agree that there is 
discernible human influence that has led to climate change.10 They also say that doubts as 
to the existence of climate change are baseless and warn that unless climate change is 
checked, humanity will suffer.11 They recommend that action must be taken to limit or 
reduce atmospheric concentrations of GHGs on a global basis.12  
3.3 International Action Regarding Climate Change 
 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) was established in 
1988 under the auspices of the United Nations Environmental Programme and the World 
Meteorological Organisation to improve the understanding of the extent and potential 
implications of the increases in anthropogenic GHG emissions and to address climate 
issues.13 The IPCC’s mandate is to (1) assess the state of existing knowledge about the 
climate system and climate change, (2) assess the environmental, economic and social 
                                                                                                                                                 
climate change as of 2002) [Tamara L. Harswick, “2002 Yearbook: Comment: Developments in Climate 
Change”].  
9Ibid.  
10D. Bodansky, Commentary supra note 6 at 456. See also, “Global Warming Worse than Feared” 
Available online at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sci/tech/newsid_996000/996115.stm.  (Last visited on  
1st March, 2004). For the view that  greenhouse gases are accumulating in the Earth’s atmosphere as a 
result of human activities leading to a rise in surface air temperatures and ocean temperatures, see National 
Academy of Sciences, “Climate Change Science, An Analysis of  Some Key Questions” available online 
at: http://www4.nationalacademics.org/nashome.nsf.(Last visited on 23rd February, 2004). 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Summary for Policy Makers: A Report of Working Group 1 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change” available online at the United Kingdom 
Meteorological office Homepage : http://www.meto.gov.uk/sec5/CR<uscorediv/ipcc/WGI_SPM.pdf>.(Last 
visited on 3rd March, 2004). Robert T.Watson, Chair, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
“Presentation at the Sixth Conference of the Parties on Climate Change” (November 13, 2000) available 
online at: http://www.ipcc.ch/press/sp_cop6.htm (Last visited on 3rd March, 2004). 
11David Boyd, Unnatural Law, supra   note 5 at 80-81 quoting Andrew Weaver The Canada Research 
Chair in Atmospheric Science in the School of Earth and Ocean Sciences at the University of Victoria who 
as saying ‘‘Those of us who work in the area of climate change science are continually befuddled as to 
what the so-called debate on global warming is all about. There is really no scientific debate on the issue, 
only an artificial debate perpetuated by the media and certain corporate interests.’’ 
See also Tom Athanasiou and Paul Baer, Dead Heat:Global Justice and Global Warming (New York: 
Steven Stories Press, 2002) 6. 
12D. Boyd, Unnatural Law supra note 5 at 81. 
13More information about the IPCC is available online at http://www.ipcc.ch. (Last visited on  3rd 
December, 2004).  
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 impacts of climate change, and (3) prepare a report on its findings and possible response 
strategies.  
The IPCCs first assessment report reviewed the state of existing knowledge on 
climate change.14 It also considered the impact of climate change. It reflected an 
assessment of the science on climate change.15 In this report, the IPCC concluded that 
anthropogenic emission of GHGs is increasing and that in the absence of specific policies 
to prevent climate change, there could be catastrophic consequences.16 In addition, the 
IPCC predicted an increase of one degree Celsius in the global average temperature by 
the year 2005 if GHG emissions were not subjected to controls.17  Although some 
scientists dispute the conclusions of the IPCC, there was a broad acceptance that the 
IPCC report provided evidence of the threat of climate change.18 The IPCC report led to 
the negotiation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
“FCCC.”19 
 
 
 
                                                 
14Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, available online at http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ipcc 
(Last visited on 21st January, 2004). 
15Ibid. 
16Ibid. 
17The IPCC report was approved after a review process and it had a powerful effect on policy makers, thus   
    providing a basis for negotiations on the FCCC. See Clare Breidenich, et al, ‘‘Current Development: The   
    Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’’ (1992) 98, American  
    Journal of International Law, 315. [Clare Breidenich, et al  ‘‘Current Development’’]. 
18Clare Breidenich, et al ‘‘Current Development’’ ibid at 316. As a result of the IPCCs findings, most  
   scientists believe that human induced emissions of GHGs increase the heat absorbing capacity of the  
   atmosphere and will result in a corresponding increase in the global average temperature. See also,  
   Duncan French, ‘‘1997 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate  
   Change’’ (1998) 10 Journal of Environmental Law, 227 at 229.  [D. French, ‘‘1997 Kyoto’’]. 
19For a full text of the FCCC, see 31 I.L.M 849.See also Protection of the Global Climate for Present and  
   Future Generations of Mankind, G. A  Res. 49212, UN GAOR 45th Session, 71st Plenary Meeting, Supp.  
   No 49, at 147-49, U.N Doc.A/45/49 (1990). [‘‘G.A Res.45/212’’] (On influence of IPCC’s report). 
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 3.4 The International Legal Response to Climate Change 
3.4.1 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
 The FCCC, negotiated in response to a growing concern about the future of the 
earth’s climate, contains a broad statement of principles and commitments in an effort to 
prevent, control or minimize human induced climate change. Under the FCCC, countries 
set the goal of achieving the stabilization of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a 
level that would prevent dangerous human induced climate change.20 The FCCC is 
significant in at least two respects. First, it is the first international environmental 
agreement on climate change to be negotiated by a majority of countries of the 
international community.21 Second, it is the foundation of worldwide efforts to combat 
climate change. Being an anticipatory response to human induced climate change, the 
FCCC is a framework for policy-making attempting to deal with the issue. Accordingly, 
the FCCC defines a common objective and contains provisions on basic guiding 
principles to help countries find an acceptable formula to address climate change. 
 The FCCC contains a wide range of provisions aimed at achieving its overall 
objective of “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level 
that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”22 The 
focus of this thesis is on the provisions of the FCCC, which deal with the PP and the DR 
Principle. 
 
 
                                                 
20Ibid. at article 2. 
21P. Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law: Frameworks, Standard and Implementation  
  (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995) 273. 
22FCCC supra note 19 at article 2. 
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 3.4.2.  The PP in the FCCC 
  The FCCC explicitly incorporates the PP. In article 3 of FCCC, countries agreed: 
The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, 
prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its 
adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a 
reason for postponing such measures, taking into account that 
policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-
effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible 
cost. To achieve this, such policies and measures should take into 
account different socio-economic contexts, be comprehensive, 
cover all relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse 
gases and adaptation, and comprise all economic sectors. Efforts 
to address climate change may be carried out co-operatively by 
interested Parties.23 
 
 The relevance of this provision cannot be over emphasized. It forms the basis to 
address the uncertainties surrounding climate change regardless of whether or not one 
believes that climate change is occurring or is likely to occur. The provision requires 
countries to take measures in order to prevent or anticipate or minimize the causes of 
climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. However, countries are expected to 
ensure that such precautionary measures are cost effective. 
 In furtherance of the PP, parties to the FCCC accepted a number of commitments. 
First, they are to formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national and, where 
appropriate, regional programmes containing measures to mitigate climate change.24 
Second, they are expected to promote and co-operate in the development, application and 
diffusion including transfer of technologies, practices and processes that control, reduce 
or prevent anthropogenic emission of GHGs.25  
                                                 
23Ibid .at article 3(3). 
24Ibid .at article 4 (1) (a). 
25Ibid. at article 4(1) (c). See generally articles 4(1) d-2(e) for other similar commitments. 
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  Further, in a bid to put in place measures aimed at preventing climate change, the 
FCCC establishes an administrative structure through the creation of a Conference of the 
Parties (‘‘COP’’) that meets annually.26 The COP is expected to keep under regular 
review the implementation of the FCCC. The COP is also expected to periodically review 
any related legal instruments that it may adopt in order make the decisions necessary to 
promote effective implementation of the FCCC.27 The COP is also expected to 
periodically examine the obligations of the parties and the institutional arrangements 
under the FCCC, in light of the objective of the FCCC, the experience gained and its 
implementation.28 The establishment of the COP is a precautionary measure aimed at 
periodically assessing the progress made by parties in curbing climate change in order to 
address any shortcomings. 
  In light of the PP and in a bid to ensure the efficacy of measures aimed at 
preventing climate change, the FCCC also established two subsidiary bodies. The 
Subsidiary Body for Implementation is responsible for the assessment and review of the 
FCCC’s implementation. The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice 
provides the COP with timely information and advice on scientific and technological 
matters relating to the FCCC.29  
 Thus the FCCC contains some provisions aimed at promoting the aims of the PP. 
It is interesting that the formulation of the PP in the FCCC urges countries to ensure that 
measures aimed at applying the PP takes into account among other factors, different socio 
                                                 
26Ibid. at article 7. Also Secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
‘‘Climate Change information Sheet 18’’, available online at: http:unfcc.int/resource/iuckit/fact 21.html, 
(Last visited on 4th November, 2003.[Secretariat, ‘‘Climate Change, Sheet 18’’]. 
27The FCCC supra note 19 at article 7(2). 
28Ibid. 
29Ibid. at articles 9 and 10. 
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 economic contexts. This requirement can be used as a basis for arguing that in 
implementing the PP, the DR Principle should also be considered. However, the FCCC 
also explicitly provides for the DR Principle.  
3.4.3  The DR Principle in the FCCC 
 It is not surprising that the FCCC also contains provisions on the DR Principle. 
This is because during the negotiation process leading to the FCCC, the developing 
countries made it clear that they would not be parties to any agreement on climate change 
unless the provisions on differentiated responsibilities are entrenched in the agreement.30 
As a result, proposed voluntary commitments for developing countries were rebuffed 
because developing countries were afraid that even a mere agreement for voluntary 
stabilization of emissions would automatically diminish the contribution and compliance 
efforts to be made by developed countries.31  
 The first reference to the DR Principle in the FCCC is in paragraph 6 of the 
preamble to the FCCC which provides: 
Acknowledging that the global nature of climate change calls for the widest 
possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in an effective and 
appropriate international response, in accordance with their common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and 
economic conditions… 
 
The significance of this paragraph cannot be over emphasized. As with every preamble, it 
lays out the intention of countries with regard to the FCCC, namely that climate change is 
a global problem that requires co-operation of all countries in accordance with the DR 
Principle.  
                                                 
30Christine Batruch, “Hot Air as Precedent for Developing Countries? Equity Considerations” (1998-99) 17        
   UCLA J. Envt’l L &Pol’y 45. [Christine Batruch, “Hot Air as Precedent for Developing Countries?     
   Equity Considerations”]. 
31Ibid. 
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  Further, the first basic principle of the FCCC, Article 3(1) of the FCCC states:  
In their actions to achieve the objective of the Convention and to 
implement its provisions, the Parties shall be guided, inter alia, by the 
following:  
1. The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present 
and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in 
accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties 
should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse 
effects thereof… 
 This provision seeks to guide the future implementation of the FCCC provisions 
as well as subsequent development of future standards. Accordingly, the DR Principle as 
provided for in the FCCC creates a roadmap, which the parties are bound to apply in an 
effort to mitigate human induced climate change.  
 In pursuance of the DR Principle, the FCCC divides countries into two groups,  
those that are listed in Annex I of the FCCC and those that are not (known as non-Annex 
I parties). Annex I parties are the industrialized countries who emitted most of the current 
concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere. The FCCC calls on parties to take account of 
the specific needs and special circumstances of developing countries.32 For example, 
Annex I parties are to stabilize their GHG emissions and assist other countries in meeting 
their commitment by offering them financial assistance and technology transfer. In this 
regard, paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 4 of the FCCC Provides: 
                                                 
32For example article 3.2 of the FCCC supra note 19. (The specific needs and special circumstances of  
  developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of  
  climate change, and of those Parties, especially developing country Parties, that would have to bear a  
  disproportionate or abnormal burden under the Convention, should be given full consideration). See also  
  article 4.4 of the FCCC. (The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II  
  shall also assist the developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of  
  climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects). See also, Article 4.8 of the FCCC  
  supra note 19 which requires developed country parties to take into account, the needs of such developing  
  countries as small island countries as well as “those prone to natural disasters” or those “liable to drought  
  and desertification”).   
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 4. The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in 
Annex II shall also assist the developing country Parties that are 
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting 
costs of adaptation to those adverse effects.  
5. The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in 
Annex II shall take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, 
as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound 
technologies and know-how to other Parties, particularly developing 
country Parties, to enable them to implement the provisions of the 
Convention. In this process, the developed country Parties shall support 
the development and enhancement of endogenous capacities and 
technologies of developing country Parties. Other Parties and 
organizations in a position to do so may also assist in facilitating the 
transfer of such technologies. 33  
   Some countries known as countries with economies in transition are partially 
treated like developed countries because they are expected to stabilize their GHG 
emissions but they are also treated like developing countries in that they assume no 
financial obligations towards developing countries but instead can benefit from 
technology transfer from developed countries.34 Developing countries assume neither 
stabilization commitments nor are they obliged to restrict their GHG emissions in any 
manner during the first commitment period. 
 Thus, the FCCC recognizes that all countries are responsible for climate change 
and should endeavor to limit the pollution that causes it. Following the DR Principle 
however, the FCCC does not require developing countries to reduce their emissions of 
GHGs. Instead, it requires developed countries to take the lead and restrict their 
emissions of GHGs consistent with the objective of the FCCC.35 
 The DR Principle is also reflected in the parties’ commitments. Some of these 
commitments are as follows: to develop and submit national communications containing 
                                                 
33Ibid at articles 4 and 5. 
34Ibid. 
35Ibid. at article 4(2)(a). 
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 inventories of greenhouse gas emissions by source and greenhouse gas removal sinks,36 
to formulate, implement, update and adopt national and where appropriate, regional 
programmes for mitigating climate change.37  Parties are also expected to promote the 
sustainable management, conservation, and enhancement of greenhouse gas sinks and 
reservoirs,38 and to take climate change into account in their relevant social, economic, 
and environmental policies.39 These general commitments reflect the DR Principle 
because they are qualified in order to take account of the circumstances of the parties to 
the FCCC. Consequently, in carrying out their commitments, parties may “take into 
account their differentiated responsibilities and their specific national and regional 
development priorities, objectives and circumstances.”40 The FCCC recognizes the 
financial and technical limitations of developing countries and their priorities of 
“economic and social development and poverty eradication.”41 As a result of this, the 
developing countries are required to take some minor actions (eg creating inventories for 
their GHG emissions) but are not required by the FCCC to reduce their GHG emissions. 
Even here, the assumption is that they will receive assistance from the developed 
countries to do so.42  
 In a bid to further operationalize the DR Principle, the FCCC requires that the 
specific needs and special circumstances of developing countries, which are particularly 
vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, and therefore would bear a 
                                                 
36Ibid. at article 4(1)(a). 
37Ibid. at article 4(1)( a).    
38Ibid. at article   4(1(d). 
39Ibid. at article 4(1(f). 
40Ibid. at article 4(1).   
41Ibid. at article 4(7). 
42Ibid. at article 4(7). (The extent to which developing country parties will effectively implement their  
   commitments under the FCCC will depend o the effective implementation by developed country parties  
   of their commitments under the FCCC related to financial resources and transfer of technology). 
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 disproportionate or abnormal burden, be given full attention.43 The FCCC also requires 
countries to co-operate in order to assist developing countries in meeting their 
obligations.44 In making provision on the necessity of meeting the specific needs and 
concerns of developing countries, 45 the FCCC recognizes that the ability of a country to 
adapt to climate change and to mitigate GHG emissions depends upon its resources, 
standard of living, and the attitude of its people toward the environment.46  
 Despite the wide range of provisions and the progress, the FCCC is merely one 
step on a much longer road toward climate change mitigation.47 For example, although 
the FCCC states that in order to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of  GHGs at 1990 
levels, it is necessary to reduce current levels of emissions from human activities by 60%, 
it is yet to be established that this percentage of reduction in GHG emission will be 
enough to prevent climate change.48 Further, the commitments in the FCCC are of a 
preliminary nature. For example, although the FCCC establishes the key reduction 
obligations of developed countries, it contains no binding emissions targets or timetables. 
The specific ways in which the provisions of FCCC is to be actualized (which countries 
will lower GHG emissions and by how much) is left to subsequent agreements.49 
3.5 The Kyoto Protocol 
 In order to achieve stabilization of GHG concentration in the atmosphere at a 
level that will prevent anthropogenic climate change, the FCCC provides for the 
negotiation of protocols that enhance the realization of the objective to reduce GHG 
                                                 
43 Ibid at articles 2 and 3(2). 
44Ibid.at articles 5 & 9. 
45Ibid.at articles 3.2, 4.8,4.9. 
46See also the Preamble to FCCC Ibid. 
47Clare Brendenich et al ‘‘Current Development’’, supra note 18, at  317. 
48See also Daniel Bodansky, ‘‘Commentary’’ supra note 6, at 451-458.  
49 The FCCC supra note 19 at articles 4 & 17.  
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 emissions.50 Since the FCCC came into force, there have been ten COPs. The most 
significant of the COPs was the Kyoto meeting where, on Dec 11 1997, the Kyoto 
Protocol51 (“Protocol”) to the FCCC was adopted. The Protocol is based on the need to 
achieve more concrete action on GHG emissions because it recognizes that emission 
reduction provisions outlined in the FCCC are not sufficient to limit the atmospheric 
concentration of GHGs.   
 Two defining features mark the Protocol. First, it imposes commitments on 
Annex I countries which are parties to the Protocol to reduce emissions of six GHGs 
collectively by an average of 5% below 1990 levels by the years 2008-2012.52  Second, it 
highlights some commitments by Annex I countries. For example, they shall strive to 
implement policies and measures in such a way as to minimize adverse effects of climate 
change.53 The Protocol provides a range of flexible instruments to help promote the 
implementation of those commitments.54  
The Protocol is complex, reflecting the complicated political, economic and 
scientific issues raised by human induced climate change. Prior to adoption of the 
Protocol, there was intense politicking and as a result the document seeks to balance 
respective interests.55 The adoption of the Protocol was an important step towards the 
                                                 
50Ibid. at article 17. 
51Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1997.UN  
   Doc.FCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1. [“the Protocol”]. For a full text of the Protocol see 37 I.L.M 32. Anastasia  
   Telesetsky, “The Kyoto Protocol” (1999), 26 Ecology L.Q. 797. 
52The Protocol supra  at article 3(1).   
53Ibid. at article 2(3). 
54 For example the Clean Development Mechanism which provides for Annex I Parties to implement  
    project activities that reduce emissions in non-Annex I Parties, in return for certified emission reductions  
   (CERs). The CERs generated by such project activities can be used by Annex I Parties to help meet their  
   emissions targets under the Kyoto Protocol. See the Protocol ibid. at article 12 , Emission Trading which  
   will allow industrialised countries to buy and sell emission credits. Countries that keep emissions below  
   their agreed target will be able to sell the excess emissions to countries that find it more difficult or more  
   expensive to meet their own targets. See the Protocol ibid. at article 17. 
55See generally, Duncan French, “1997 Kyoto Protocol” supra note 18 at 231. 
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 mitigation of climate change although some feel that many of the provisions represent the 
views of developed countries.56  
 As of April 29th, 2005, 150 states and regional economic integration organizations 
have deposited instruments of ratifications, accessions, approvals or acceptances of the 
Protocol. Nigeria ratified the Protocol in November 2004,57 China ratified earlier on July 
30, 2002 while India’s ratification followed on August 6, 2002.58 Despite their ratification 
of the Protocol, as developing countries under the Protocol, Nigeria, China and India are 
not bound to reduce their GHG emissions during 2008-2012. However the ratification of 
these countries can be interpreted as evidence of agreement on their part that there is a 
need for a global effort to prevent climate change.  
 To enter into force, the Protocol underwent a two-step ratification process. First, 
fifty-five parties had to ratify the Protocol, and second, the ratifying parties had to 
represent countries that have at least fifty- five percent of global carbon dioxide 
emissions.59 
 It is believed that the Protocol will strengthen the international response to climate 
change because it contains legally binding emission targets for industrialized countries, a 
measure aimed at reducing and reversing the upward trend in GHG emissions.60 This 
belief was re-iterated at the COP (“The COP 10”) held in Buenos Aires- Argentina 
between 11 and 17th December, 2004. The COP-10 concluded with an emphasis that 
                                                 
56Ibid. 
57Dan Ede, Nigeria Ratifies the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, This Day Newspaper,3rd Dec, 2004,  
   available online at http://thisdayonline.com/view.php.( Last visited on  3rd Dec, 2004).  
58Tamara L. Harswick, “2002 Yearbook: Comment: Developments in Climate Change”, supra note 5 at  
25. 
59The Protocol supra note 51 at article 25. See also, Kyoto Protocol: Status of Ratification, Available online   
   http:www.unfcc.com/resource/kpstats.pdf.(Last visited on  20th Nov, 2004). 
60Climate Change information sheet 18, available online at http:unfcc.int/resource/iuckit/fact 21.html, (Last   
   visited, 24th August 2003). 
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 climate change remains the most vital global challenge to humanity and that its adverse 
effects are already a reality in many parts of the world.61 Many parties also emphasized 
the need to provide support to developing countries in an effort to curb the adverse 
effects of climate change.62 Also, countries re-affirmed their resolve to prevent 
anthropogenic climate change and stated that an adherence to the commitments in the 
Protocol will help in this regard.63 
 The Protocol contains provisions, which affirm the PP and the DR Principle. 
There are also references in the Protocol to how these principles will be operationalized 
by countries.  
3.5.1 The PP in the Protocol  
 The preliminary point must be made that the Protocol does not contain express 
provisions, urging countries to take precautionary measures in order to prevent climate 
change. However, some of its provisions are aimed at achieving this objective.64 Also, the 
preamble to the Protocol affirms that the protocol will be guided by article 3 of the 
FCCC, which clearly adopts the PP.65  
 In order to put in place measures to prevent climate change, article 2 of the 
Protocol contains policies and procedures that Annex I parties shall implement in order to 
ensure a reduction in their emissions of GHGs. Some specific policies and measures 
include: enhancing energy efficiency; protecting and enhancing GHG sinks and 
reservoirs; promoting sustainable agriculture; and, encouraging reforms to lower GHG 
                                                 
61See generally, Secretariat, Framework Convention on Climate Change Press Release, “ Milan Conference  
  Concludes as Ministers Call for Urgent and Coordinated  Action on Climate Change” available online at:  
  http//www.unfcc.int, (Last visited on December 31, 2004). 
62Ibid. 
63Ibid. 
64 For example the provision on policies and procedures, see Protocol supra note 51 at article 2. See also  
   article 9.  
65Ibid. at Preamble. 
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 emissions.66 However, parties are required to implement these measures in accordance 
with the DR Principle (in accordance with their national capabilities).67  
 Article 3 of the Protocol manifests the PP. It binds Annex I parties either 
individually or jointly to meet an agreed limitation target in respect of six GHGs. The 
agreed limitation is known as quantified emissions reduction and limitation objective 
(“QERLO”).The QERLO varies among individual developed countries with developing 
countries assuming no emission limitations. The first paragraph of article 3 establishes 
that the central purpose of meeting the individual QELROs is to achieve the overarching 
objective of lowering emissions of GHGs to 5% below 1990 levels by the target date of 
2008-2012. In pursuance of this goal, each Annex I country’s binding emission level is 
set forth in Annex B of the protocol. For example, the EU has an 8% reduction, while 
Japan and Canada agreed to a 6% reduction of GHGs from 1990 levels. The use of 
different targets among developed countries is also a manifestation of the DR Principle. 
To the extent they accommodate differences between developed countries, these targets 
achieve some measure of substantive equality. Unfortunately, the text of the Protocol 
does not make it clear as to the basis for imposition of differing targets among developed 
countries. 
 In order to ensure compliance with its target, each Annex I party must also 
establish a national monitoring system by 2007.68 Article 9 allows for a periodic review 
of the protocol. Periodic review is a necessary precautionary step because it allows the 
COP to take appropriate steps in response to changing scientific knowledge.  
                                                 
66Ibid. at article 2. 
67Ibid. 
68 Ibid. at article 5. 
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  In an attempt to ensure that measures are in place to prevent climate change in the 
future, the Protocol requires countries to put modalities in place for the adoption of 
environmentally sound technologies and to take all practicable steps to ensure appropriate 
financing. 69 The parties must also adopt policies for the effective transfer of 
environmentally sound technologies that are publicly owned or in the public domain and 
for the creation of an enabling environment for the private sector to do the same.70  The 
motive behind these provisions is not in dispute. They are meant to achieve the aims of 
the PP so as to prevent climate change before its occurrence. 
3.5.2 The DR Principle in the Protocol 
 The history of the DR Principle in the Protocol can be traced to the first COP in 
Berlin. At that conference, countries agreed to the Berlin Mandate whereby developed 
countries pledged to act first to reduce their GHG emissions before requiring developing 
countries to do so.71 The Berlin Mandate affirms that implementation of the FCCC shall 
be guided inter alia by the DR Principle.72  The Berlin Mandate also reminds countries 
that they are required to consider the special needs and circumstances of developing 
countries and that:  
The largest share of historical and current global emissions of 
greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries, and that 
the per capita emissions in developing countries are still 
relatively low and that the share of global emissions originating 
                                                 
69Ibid. at article 10(c). 
70Ibid. 
71See generally, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its First Session, Held at  Berlin from 28th  
  March to 7 April 1995, Addendum, Part Two, Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its first  
  session, UNFCC. Ist Sess, UN Doc. .FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (1995) [“Berlin Mandate”].Also available  
  online at http//www.unfcc.de/resource/docs/cop1/07aol.pdf. (Last visited on 14th May, 2004). In signing  
  the Berlin Mandate, developed countries agreed to act first in reducing GHGs before developing countries   
  would be required to do same. The Berlin Mandate specifically stated that there would be no new  
  commitments for developing countries in the first commitment period. 
72 Ibid. at article 1(1)(a). 
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 in developing countries will grow to meet their social and 
development needs.73 
 
Further, the Berlin Mandate states: 
The global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible 
cooperation by all countries and their participation in an effective 
way and appropriate international response, in accordance with 
their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities and their social and economic conditions”74 
 
This sentiment continued when the protocol was negotiated. Accordingly, negotiations 
for the Protocol were premised on the DR Principle.75  
 In conformity with the DR Principle and in affirmation of the Berlin Mandate, the 
Protocol does not require developing countries to agree to new commitments to limit 
their GHG emissions. Accordingly, the Protocol is devoid of reference to commitments 
by developing countries. Instead, it affirms the DR Principle: all parties must take into 
account, “their common but differentiated responsibilities and their specific national and 
regional development priorities, objectives and circumstances without introducing any 
new commitments for parties not included in Annex I”76 
The Protocol contains express provisions which incorporate the DR Principle. 
First, the Protocol divides parties into groups namely, Annex I which includes the 
developed countries, some countries in central and Eastern Europe as well as the newly 
independent states that resulted from the soviet breakup, Annex II namely, the 
organization for economic co-operation and development countries.77  
                                                 
73Ibid.  at article 1(1)(d). 
74Ibid. at article 1(1)(e). 
75Paul G Harris, ‘‘Common But Differentiated Responsibility: The Kyoto Protocol and the United States  
   Policy’’[1999] 7 New York University Environmental Law Journal 33 [Paul G Harris, ‘‘Common But  
   Differentiated Responsibility’’]. 
76The Protocol, supra note 51 at article 10. 
77Ibid. 
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  Furthermore, the Protocol differentiates within the group of developed countries 
with respect to how far below 1990 (if at all) their emissions targets should be.78 The use 
of targets (among some developed countries) by the Protocol based on emission levels of 
countries affirms the DR Principle because it imposes different standards on countries 
which are classified as developed. It means, for example that if country A (a developed 
country) is to reduce its emission level by 10% from its emission level of 160 tons, 
country A would be allowed to emit 144 tons, while country B (another developed 
country) which agreed to reduce its emission level of 200 tons by 10% from the year 
before would be allowed to emit 180 tons of GHGs.  
 It should be noted that although some developed countries have emission limits 
and are expected to make some progress towards their assigned limits by 2005,79 a few 
developed countries such as Australia, Norway and Iceland are not bound by such 
restrictions. The later group of countries are entitled to increase emissions due to peculiar 
economic and other factors.80 This position is regrettable because it allows those 
developed countries to continue to emit detrimental quantities of GHGs. 
 The Protocol shows a commitment to climate change prevention because it 
recognizes the need for speedier implementation of existing commitments. It states that 
all parties should formulate and implement programmes to mitigate climate change and 
measures to facilitate adequate adaptation, especially in regards to “energy, transport and 
industry sectors as well as agriculture, forestry and waste management.”81 Ironically, the 
                                                 
78The Protocol, supra note 51 at article 2 (on policies and procedures that Annex 1 parties shall implement  
   in order to meet their quantified emissions limitation and reduction limits and minimize climate change  
   effect on developing countries).  
79Ibid. at  article 3(2). 
80Ibid.at annex 1.  
81Ibid. at article 10(b) (i). 
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 Protocol rejected the imposition of new commitments for developing country parties.82 It 
re-affirms the DR Principle, the national and regional development priorities of 
developing countries and their desire for increased technological and financial assistance. 
It states that developing country parties are to be helped in re-affirmation of existing 
commitments through further technical and financial assistance.  
 In relation to financial assistance, the Protocol re-confirms the DR Principle by 
requiring that developed countries provide new and additional financial resources to meet 
the agreed full costs incurred by developing parties in preparing national inventories, as 
part of the obligation.83 Developed countries are also required to “provide such financial 
resources needed by the developing country parties to meet the agreed full incremental 
costs of advancing the implementation of some existing commitments.”84  
 The Protocol has been criticised on grounds that even if its targets are achieved, 
there will be little effect on climate change.85 Also, the exemption of developing 
countries from commitments to limit the emission of GHGs means that they have been 
authorized to continue to emit detrimental amounts of GHGs.86   
 Notwithstanding these criticisms, many believe that the Protocol is a necessary 
step towards mitigation of climate change.87 As stated, it was negotiated to address the 
                                                 
82Ibid. at article 10 (all parties taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and their  
  specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and circumstance, without introducing  
  any new commitments for the parties not included in Annex I but reaffirming existing commitments and  
  continuing to advance the implementation of these commitments in order to achieve sustainable  
  development, taking into account article 4, Paragraphs 3, 5 and 7 of FCCC). 
83Ibid. at article 11(2)(a) . 
84Ibid. at article 11(2)(b). 
85Roger Sedjo, “Post Kyoto: Bush’s Next Steps on Climate Change” available online at  
   http//www.rrf.org/rrf/publications/weathervane/features/2001/post-kyoto-bushes, (Last visited on 12  
   December, 2003). See also,Lakshman Guruswamy, “Climate Change: The Next Dimension”(2000) 15 J.  
   Land Use &Envtl. Law, 341 [Lakshman Guruswamy, “Climate Change”]. 
86See generally, C Stevens, “Interpreting the Polluter Pays Principle in the Trade and Environment  
   Context” (1994) 27 Cornell Int. L.J 577. 
87Worldview Climate Change: Bonn Talks Close with Little Resolved, Green wire, June 15, 1998 at 19 
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 inadequacies of the FCCC, in an effort to globally confront climate change. The Protocol 
also shows that the international community is united on the issue of climate change.  
3.6  The DR Principle and the PP in the Climate Change Context 
 The provisions of the PP and the DR Principle in the FCCC and the Protocol 
support the propositions that while the PP is based upon the need to prevent the 
threatened effects of climate change, the DR Principle is grounded, inter alia, on the need 
to prevent climate change as well as notion of fairness in adopting preventative measures. 
The PP seeks to prevent the effects of climate change by encouraging countries to co-
operatively address the issue. It also outlines how countries should approach situations 
where the facts relating to the possibility of climate change are not fully settled. 
Accordingly, it requires countries to take measures to anticipate, prevent or minimise the 
causes of climate change.  
 The DR Principle just like the PP encourages countries, based on their 
capabilities, to take measures in order to prevent climate change. This creates differential 
norms of compliance: binding obligations to limit GHG emissions are dependent on a 
country’s status as a developed or developing country. Developed countries must also 
transfer funds and technology to developing countries and are expected to assist them in 
order to facilitate their efforts to reduce GHG emissions. This dichotomization of 
responsibilities, whereby countries are asked to contribute resources to the global effort 
to curb climate change based on their status as developed or developing countries creates 
differential norms of contribution.88 The operationalization of the DR Principle also 
                                                                                                                                                 
    World Resources Institute, “WRI President calls Kyoto Protocol a Historic step for Humankind” Dec 11,    
    1997available online at:<http://www/wri.org/wri/press/kyoto_nr.html>? (Last visited on 23rd May,  
    2005).  
88See generally, Michael Weisslitz, “Rethinking the Equitable Principle of Common But Differentiated  
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 imposes different levels of responsibility on developed countries with regard to 
environmental protection. For example before the United States of America (“the US”) 
withdrew from the Protocol, it was required to reduce its emissions more than Canada.89 
On the other hand, the US, the largest source of GHGs and the wealthiest economy in the 
world, is required to reduce its emissions on a percentage basis by less than the EU. This 
is so despite the fact that EU citizens produce fewer GHGs in the aggregate and less per 
capita than the Americans.90 Similarly, despite the fact that most developed countries are 
required to reduce their emissions, Australia (which is yet to ratify the Protocol) is 
permitted to increase its emissions by 8%.91 This difference is ostensibly based on 
national circumstances but in reality, reflects political bargaining in the Kyoto process.92 
This is, during negotiations leading to adoption of the Protocol, Australia won a right to 
increase its GHG emissions to secure its support for the Protocol.93  
 It is easy to appreciate the motive behind the DR Principle in the climate change 
context. Drafters of the FCCC and the Protocol believed that since the participation of a 
majority of countries was crucial to the success of global effort aimed at preventing 
climate change, differentiated obligations was a means of encouraging reluctant countries 
to participate in a global effort to prevent climate change.94 They reasoned that the DR 
Principle promoted fairness in that as developed countries are responsible for the majority 
of past emissions of GHGs and also have the capacity to control them, they should 
                                                                                                                                                 
  Responsibility: Differential Verus Absolute Norms of Compliance Contribution in the Global Climate   
  Change Context” (2002) 13 Colo J. Int’l Envt’l &Pol’y 473. Hereinafter  Michael Weisslitz, “Rethinking  
  the Equitable Principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibility.” 
89See Protocol, supra note 51,Annex B. 
90See World Resources Institute  et al, World Resources (1996) 315 at 319. 
91See Protocol, supra note 51 at annex 40.  
92Paul G Harris, Common But Differentiated Responsibility, supra  note 76 at 35. 
93See “Australia rejects Kyoto Pact” Available online at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-   
pacific/2026446.stm (Last visited on 4th June, 2005).  
94FCCC, supra note 19 at Preamble and articles 3 and 4.  
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 assume the lions share responsibility for climate change prevention.95 This is not, 
however the crucial point. Participation by developing countries (which can be achieved 
by means of financial assistance, technology transfer and other aid mechanisms) is 
necessary for the success of climate change prevention. However, such participation can 
only be effective if developing countries agree to limit their emission of GHGs. The 
success of international efforts aimed at preventing the consequences of climate change 
will ultimately depend upon the ability of countries to refrain from emitting detrimental 
amounts of GHGs. 
 The total exemption of developing countries in the FCCC and Protocol from even 
voluntary commitments, deviates from the aims of the PP, and could have catastrophic 
consequences. The exemption of developing countries from commitments to restrict 
emission of GHGs can be interpreted as authorizing them to continue emitting 
detrimental amounts of GHGs. 
 In addition, there are fears that as a result of the DR Principle, developing 
countries will have an unfair economic advantage over developed countries in that they 
will not be facing the same environmental restrictions.96 This could lead to a situation 
whereby companies which rely heavily on fossil fuel for their operations move away 
from developed to developing countries in order to take advantage of the relaxed 
environmental regulations.97  Also, it is possible that GHG emission controls will raise 
the cost in developed countries of manufacturing those goods whose production requires 
                                                 
95 Ibid . See Preamble to the Protocol,  supra note 51. See also Vincent Cusack, “Perceived Costs versus  
   Benefits of Meeting the Kyoto Target for Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction: the Australian  
   Perspective” (1999) 16 Environmental Law and Planning Law Journal, 55. 
96 Paul G Harris, Common But Differentiated Responsibility supra note 76 at 37. See also, Senate  
    Resolution 98, 105th Congress. 143 Cong Rec. s8138-39 (daily ed. July 25, 1997). 
97Ibid. 
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 the burning of fossil fuels.98 Industries in developing countries such as China, India and 
Brazil gain an advantage over industries in countries that adhere to emission controls. 
Having invested in production facilities as part of their economic development, 
developing countries may in turn be reluctant to accept emission control measures that 
threaten such activities.99 Admittedly, a way out of this problem may be to encourage 
cleaner or alternate technology in developed countries which may then be exported to 
developing countries. However, this proposed solution can only be effective if 
developing countries also internalize environmental control measures. 
 Some commentators support the lack of restrictions on the emission of GHGs in 
developing countries on grounds that it will help them to develop and strengthen their 
economies.100 They argue that owing to special needs and circumstances of developing 
countries, it would be unfair to expect them to limit their economic development in the 
same manner as developed countries. In other words, the economies of developing 
countries cannot thrive if they are subject to the same binding GHG emission targets as 
developed countries.101 This argument appears convincing partly because it is consistent 
with one of the theories which justifies the DR Principle (special needs and 
circumstances of developing countries). However, the exemption of developing countries 
from even voluntary commitments to restrict GHG emissions could result in further 
                                                 
98 Michael Weisslitz, Rethinking the Equitable Principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibility  
   supra note 88 at 473. 
99 Henry D Jacoby et al, “Kyoto’s Unfinished Business” (1998) 77 Foreign Affairs 54. See also, Richard B  
   Stewart, “Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness” (1993) 102 Yale L.J 2039 (in  
   order for economies of developing countries to be able to effectively compete on an international level,  
   equal rules and regulations must apply to developing as well as developed states. If developing states  
   were allowed to direct their industries in an environmentally destructive direction, drastic changes would   
   need to be enforced by the time their economies had already become significantly entrenched). 
100Paul G. Harris, “Environment, History and International Justice” (July, 1997) 40 J.Int’l Stud at 1  
101Daniel Barstow Magraw, “Legal Treatment of Developing Countries: Differential, Contextual and  
    Absolute Norms” (1990) 1 Colo J. Int’l Envt’l Law and Pol’y 69, 70. [Daniel Barstow Magraw,  “Legal  
    Treatment of Developing Countries”]. Michael Hart & Bill Dymond, “Special Treatment and Differential  
    Treatment and Doha “Development” Round” (2003) 37 J. World Trade 395. 
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 problems by focusing heavily on economic and social, as opposed to environmental and 
health concerns thereby ignoring the severity of the climate change problem. Such 
exemption also ignores the fact that developing countries are encouraged to grow their 
economies in an environmentally destructive direction by virtue of this policy. 
 The international community accepted the proposition that the PP must be applied 
in the climate change context because climate change prevention is preferable to remedial 
measures after its occurrence. Regrettably, the exemption of developing countries from 
voluntary commitments to emit GHGs deviates from the aims of the PP. By ignoring the 
conceptual responsibility of developing countries for climate change, such exemption 
will exacerbate climate change. The evidence suggests that GHG emission by developing 
states is on the increase.102 It is estimated that developing countries will emit more GHGs 
than developed countries in the next few years.103 Accordingly, the potential for 
developing countries to cause human induced climate change is high.104 The case of 
China, which is considered a developing country under the climate change regime, is 
illustrative.105 
                                                 
102Gunther Handl, “Environmental Security and Global Change, The Challenge to International Law”  
    (1990) 1 Y.B Int’l Envt’l Law 3-4.[Gunther Handl, “Environmental Security and Global   
   Change”].Christine Batruch, “Hot Air as Precedent for Developing Countries? Equity Considerations”  
    supra note 30 at 45. 
103Mark A Drumbl, “Does Sharing Know its Limits? Thoughts on Implementing International  
    Environmental Agreements: A Review of National Environmental Policies, A Comparative Study of  
   Capacity Building” (1999) 18 Va Envt’l L.J 281, 286. Henry Shue, “After You: May Action by the Rich  
   Be Contingent Upon Action by the Poor?” (1994) 1 Indiana J. Global Legal Stud 343 at 365.Walter V  
   Reid & Jose Goldenberg, “ Are Developing Countries already doing as much as Industrialized Countries  
   to slow Climate change”?( 1997) 26 Energy Pol’y  233. Also, Christine Batruch, “Hot Air as Precedent  
   for Developing Countries? Equity Considerations” supra note 30 at 45 (while  the total emissions in  
   developing countries are still relatively low, their emissions are expected to surpass those of the  
   developed world by 2020 under a normal growth scenario. Delaying or limiting developing countries  
   reduction would cause an increase in green house emissions, thereby seriously compromising the  
   stabilization objective of the FCCC). 
104Ibid.  at 50.Paul G Harris, Common But Differentiated Responsibility supra note 76 at  38.  
    See also Daniel Bodansky, “Managing Climate Change”(1992) 3 Yearbook of International   
    Environmental Law 71. 
105James Harding, “China Emerging as Bad Boy in Pollution Stakes” Fin Times, Dec 9, 1997 at 4. 
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  As of 1998, China emitted 14% of the world’s GHGs as compared to 22% emitted 
by the United States at the same period.106 These emissions contribute to smog, acid rain 
and climate change within China and around the world.107 China is now the world’s 
second largest emitter of GHGs and is expected to surpass the United States in a few 
years.108 In comparison to Canada and the United States, China’s per capita energy 
consumption is expected to rise with future economic development and rising standards 
of living causing GHG emissions to increase as well. If the predictions associated with 
energy consumption are accurate, China’s annual emissions could rise to 2380 metric 
tones of carbon by the year 2020, with the total of GHG emissions in the order of 3.2 
billion tons by 2025109 with corresponding negative consequences on the climate.110  
  China continues to emit GHGs without restraint because it is classified as a 
developing country in the climate change regime. Regrettably, despite complaints by 
some developed countries, the central government in China has over the years, continued 
to encourage emission of detrimental amount of GHGs. It exempts power plants from 
                                                 
106See generally Deborah Cooper, “The Kyoto Protocol and China: Global Warming’s Sleeping Giant”  
    (1999) 11 Geo. Int’l Envt’l L.Rev 401 at 404-407. [Deborah Cooper, “The Kyoto Protocol and China:  
    Global Warming’s Sleeping Giant”]. (Examining the vast impact that China is predicted to have on  
    emissions of GHGs and arguing that  as China continue to grow, her emissions of GHGs will increase  
    dramatically and would perhaps exceed that of developed countries). See also Tauna M. Szymanski,  
    “Taming the Dragon Heads: Controlling Air Emissions From Power Plants in China-An Analysis of  
    China’s Air Pollution Policy and Regulatory Framework” (2002) 32 Envt’l L. Rep 11, 439. 
    [Tauna M. Szymanski, “Taming the Dragon Heads”] Chen Fu. “The SO2 Control Strategy in China”   
    Workshop on the Feasibility of Using Market Mechanisms to Achieve Sulfur Dioxide Emissions  
     Reduction in China. Beijing, Nov. 15-18, 1999:6, [China Climate Change Country Study] (Coal fired  
     power plants which generates about two thirds of China’s energy are the leading source of air pollution  
     in china today contributing up to massive sulfur and carbon dioxide emissions.). 
107McElroy, Michael. “Industrial Growth, Air Pollution, and Environmental Damage.” Energizing China:  
    Reconciling Environmental Protection and Economic Growth. Cambridge MA: Harvard University  
    Press, 1997: 241-26. 
108Nielson, Chris P. and Michael B. McElroy. “Introduction and Overview.”, Energizing China: 
    Reconciling Environmental Protection and Economic Growth. (Cambridge MA: Harvard University   
    Press, 1997) at 27. 
109Deborah Cooper, “The Kyoto Protocol and China: Global Warming’s Sleeping Giant”supra  note 102 at  
    407 Tauna M. Szymanski, “Taming the Dragon Heads” supra  note 106 at  439. 
110Homer Sun, Note, “Controlling the Environmental Consequences of Power Development in the People’s  
    Republic of China” (1996) 17 Mich. J .Int’l L, 1015 at 1037. 
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 environmental regulations that might hinder the development of its energy sector.111 
Consequently, despite China’s minimal contribution to GHG emissions in the past, her 
current emissions forecast a bleak situation. 
  The inability to extract commitments to reduce GHG emissions from developing 
countries has resulted in some countries withdrawing from the Protocol thus defeating the 
aims of PP. For example, the US withdrew from the Protocol partially because of a lack 
of commitment by developing countries to reduce GHG emissions.112 The withdrawal 
from the treaty by the world’s largest emitter of GHGs means that the US will not be 
bound by obligations negotiated in the Protocol. It can also be interpreted to mean that 
the US does not accept all aspects of the leadership role they are expected to exercise 
with respect to the global effort to prevent climate change.113 
 Despite these concerns, developing countries are opposed to the idea of 
mandatory commitment by them to reduce GHG emissions. They argue that economic 
development is a necessity while environmental protection is a luxury that they cannot 
afford. 114 Accordingly, at the eighth conference of the parties (COP-8) in 2002, the 
parties formulated a declaration that does not impose any future commitment on 
                                                 
111Tauna M. Szymanski, “Taming the Dragon Heads”supra  note 106 at  440. (Emissions of GHGs which    
     exceeds standards set up in regulations are not considered legal violations under current law).See also,  
     Dasgupta, Susmit, Mainul Hug and David Wheeler, “Bending the Rules: Discretionary Pollution  
     Control in China”  World Bank Policy  Research Department Working Paper, Feb. 1997 3. 
112Another reason is the present administration’s determination not to accept any measure that could  
     undermine the US economy. See Letter to the Members of the US Senate on the Kyoto Protocol, (March  
     13, 2001) 37 Weekly Comp. Pres Doc 11 hereinafter “Bush’s Letter on Kyoto” also available online at  
     <http//www.whitehouse.gov. (Last visited on 14th June, 2004), see also, Lavanya Rajamani, “The   
     Principle of CBDR and the Balance of Commitments under the Climate Regime” (2000) 9 Rev Eur     
     Comm & Int’l Envt’l L 120. 
113Christopher C. Joyner, “Burning International Bridges, Fuelling Global Discontent, the United States and   
     Rejection of the Kyoto Protocol” (2002) 33 Victoria U. Wellington L. Rev 27. 
114Lakshman Guruswamy, “Climate Change supra   note  86 at 364. It appears however that the position of  
     developing countries on the necessity of economic development at the expense of environmental  
     protection is becoming fractionalized. See also Cheryl Hogue, “Climate Change: Once Solid Developing  
    Country Bloc Dividing into Five or More Factions” (1998) 21 Int’l Envt’l Rep (BNA) 1201. 
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 developing countries to agree to emission targets or to reduce their current emissions of 
GHGs.115 Instead, the declaration merely calls on all countries to ratify the Protocol in the 
face of growing evidence of the damage done by climate change.  
 The position of developing countries is understandable. It is indisputable that in 
most developing countries, problems of poverty, famine, and social unrest appear more 
challenging than the negative consequences of climate change. These problems make it 
difficult, if not impracticable, for most developing countries to put in place stringent 
measures to tackle the daunting problem of climate change in the same way as developed 
countries. Developing countries have a right to development affirmed in the FCCC as a 
right to sustainable development requiring each party to “take into account that economic 
measures are essential to adopting measures to address climate change.”116 This 
recognizes that a formal equality approach placing similar obligations on developed and 
developing countries would yield undesirable results. Accordingly, an argument can be 
made that from a moral perspective, an urgent and undeniable imperative exists that the 
standard of living of the world’s poorest countries be improved. 
 However, prevention of climate change is crucial. This can only be achieved if all 
countries are encouraged to take steps to avoid those activities which cause climate 
change. Accordingly, developing countries should be urged to make a sacrifice (by 
                                                 
115Eight Conference of the Parties to the U.N Framework Convention on Climate Change, 42 Earth  
     Negotiations Bulletin, NO 209 available online   
    at:<http//www.iisd.ca/linkages/download/asc/enbl2209e.txt.(Last visited on 23rd May, 2005), See also  
    Anonymous, Proposal to Reduce Greenhouse Gases Loses Momentum , N.Y Times, Nov 2, 2002 at A4  
    (the wording of the declaration at the end of the Eight conference of the parties was a victory for  
    developing countries which fought hard to ensure that the declaration did not include any possible future  
    measures they might have to abide). See also, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, “Speech of Prime Minister Shri Atal  
    Bihari Vajpayee at the High Level Segment of the Eight Session of Conference of the Parties to the UN  
    Framework Convention on Climate Change New Delhi”, October 30, 2002, available online at  
    http://unfcc.int/cop8/latest/ind_pm3010.pdf (Last visited on 24th January, 2005). 
116Articles 3(4), of the FCCC supra note 19. See also article 3(5) which states that parties should co-operate  
    to achieve sustainable economic development of all parties. 
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 placing restrictions on their GHG emissions) in order to ensure a healthy climate and 
avoid the deleterious consequences of climate change. Incentives in the form of 
financial/technical assistance to developing countries in order to aid them in their efforts 
to limit GHG emissions could compliment such measures. 
 Fortunately, the FCCC has provisions for funding mechanisms which can be used 
to encourage developing countries. If the international community embraces and honestly 
implement these funding mechanisms, developing countries may be encouraged to accept 
a limitation on their emissions of GHGs. For example, the Special Climate Change Fund 
(SCCF) under the FCCC can be used to finance projects relating to: adaptation; 
technology transfer and capacity building; energy, transport, industry, agriculture, 
forestry and waste management; and economic diversification.117 In the same vein, the 
Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) is available to support a work programme to 
assist developing and least developed countries to implement national adaptation 
programmes aimed at preventing climate change.118 Finally the Adaptation Fund (AF) 
can be employed to support the implementation of concrete adaptation projects and the 
increased costs of developing countries associated with meeting their anticipated 
commitments to restrict GHG emissions in their countries.119  
                                                 
117Information on this is available online at:  
     http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/funding/special_climate_change_fund/items/2602.php, (Last  
     visited on 25th May, 2005). 
118Information on this is available online at:  
     http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/funding/ldc_fund/items/2601.php(Last visited on 25th May, 
2005). 
119Information on this is available online, see  
     http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/funding/adaptation_fund/items/2600.php, (Last Visited May  
     25th 2005). For the suggestion that the foregoing mechanisms are ineffective, see, R. Ramachandran,  
    “Consensus and Conflicts” Frontline, Volume 19 - Issue 23, November 09 - 22 2002, available online at:  
    http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1923/stories/20021122007312300.htm, (Last visited on 23rd May,  
    2005). 
 80
  The above funding mechanisms are good. However, they need to be 
complimented with a commitment by developing countries to limit their GHG emissions. 
In this regard, the international community may borrow from the model that was applied 
under the Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete the Ozone Layer.120 Under that 
model, developing countries are only bound by emission reductions when an agreement 
on compensatory financing and technology transfer is reached with developed 
countries.121 To apply this model in the climate change context, the international 
community will need to enter into an agreement on limitation of GHG emissions. Under 
the terms of this agreement, developing countries must commit to limit their GHG 
emissions while developed countries will provide technology and funding for this 
purpose.  
 To give more credibility to the proposed model, the international community may 
choose to involve the World Bank to finance the agreed cost of developing countries 
meeting their commitment to restrict GHG emissions. This approach was also adopted 
under the Montreal Protocol, whereby an agreement was reached between the executive 
committee of the interim multilateral fund (“executive committee”) for the 
implementation of the Montreal Protocol and the World Bank.122 Under that agreement, 
the World Bank agreed “to co-operate with the executive committee and assist it in 
administering and managing a programme under the authority of the parties to finance the 
                                                 
120See generally The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer available online at     
   http//www.unep.org/ozone/montreal-protocol/montreal-protocol2000.html, Particularly articles 5 and 10  
   (Last visited on  10th Sept 2004). 
121Ibid.  at article 5. 
122 See generally, “Agreement between the Executive Committee of the Interim Multilateral Fund for the  
   Implementation of the Montreal Protocol and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development  
   (World Bank) available online at http://www.unmfs.org/policydoc44p633.htm (Last visited on  23rd  
    May, 2005). 
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 agreed incremental costs of parties operating under paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the 
Montreal Protocol.”123  
 To involve the World Bank in the proposed funding arrangement, the 
international community could establish a “Climate Change Fund Committee” to oversee 
and liaise with the World Bank on modalities for provision of funding. 
 Incentives beyond those currently contemplated in the FCCC and the Protocol to 
encourage developing country participation in the international effort to prevent or 
mitigate climate change can be justified on grounds that it is aimed at ensuring the 
protection of the climate. Such incentives also provide a means of making developed 
countries pay, albeit belatedly, for environmental degradation associated with their 
economic and social development.  
 The use of incentives is a variant of the notion of substantive equality and is 
preferable to total exemption of developing countries from a commitment to restrict their 
GHG emissions. If a developing country incurs an opportunity cost by forgoing a natural 
development option to preserve environmental resources that are of global or special 
interest to other states, it should be entitled to some compensation. The fact that such 
restraint would also be in its long-term interest should not foreclose this entitlement.124 
Afterall, financial assistance arrangements, debt forgiveness strategies, as well as 
numerous formal and informal declarations in the international arena, testify to the 
recognition of the legitimacy of such claims.125  
                                                 
123Ibid. 
124Gunther Handl, “Environmental Security, and Global Change” supra note 102 at 84. 
125Ibid. 
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 3.7 Conclusion 
 There is a need to formulate an effective international agreement to prevent 
climate change. This need is even more daunting at this stage in the life of the FCCC and 
the Protocol with negotiations for the second commitment period for the Protocol set to 
commence later in the year. 
 In order achieve the foregoing objective, two things are crucial. First there is a 
need for application of the PP. This would entail taking measures to prevent climate 
change, including a restriction on the emission of GHGs by all countries. The PP, if 
properly applied in the context of global climate change obligations will lead to increased 
stringent global commitments by introducing limitations on actions of states in relation to 
emission of GHGs. Second, more nations need to be encouraged to participate in the 
FCCC and the Protocol. The strength of any international agreement on climate change 
depends on the commitment of its signatories. Participation could be encouraged by 
adjusting the distribution of emission targets among parties away from historical 
emissions to a distribution, which reflects generally acceptable and effective criterion.  
 The DR Principle encourages participation in the FCCC and Protocol by 
developing countries, thereby increasing the number of countries that agree to be bound 
by its provisions. However as noted, the zero emission reduction aspect of the DR 
Principle has the perverse effect of not only discouraging some developed countries from 
participating in international agreements to curb climate change but also exacerbating 
climate change. 
 Since the zero emission reduction aspect of the DR Principle allows developing 
countries to continue producing increasing detrimental amounts of GHGs, it should be 
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 abandoned. It is true that it secures participation by developing countries, a crucial 
element to the efficacy of global efforts to prevent climate change. However this 
participation is not effective. Developing countries can be encouraged to participate in 
the global effort to prevent climate change without exemption from the obligation to 
avoid that which causes climate change.  
 To encourage developing countries to agree to place a restriction on their GHG 
emissions, the use of incentives namely financial assistance, technology transfer and debt 
forgiveness should be fully explored.  
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 4         Conclusion 
 
        Given the nature of human induced climate change, an effective international 
agreement which implements reductions in the emission of GHGs has to involve all the 
countries that account for GHG emissions. The effectiveness of any agreement, which 
seeks to curb the incidence of climate change, is, to a large measure, influenced by the 
number of countries, which agree to place restrictions on their emissions of GHGs. 
             The current pattern under the climate change regime whereby differential 
treatment in the form of zero restriction and increases in GHG emission is made for some 
countries does not constitute an effective approach to remedying the climate change 
crisis.1 The regime overlooks the fact that GHG emissions from all countries are at the 
root of climate change. Restriction of GHG emissions by some developed countries alone 
cannot prevent climate change; increasing emissions of GHGs by developing countries 
will offset the efforts made by those developed countries. 
             Developing countries can share some responsibility for climate change mitigation 
by accepting restrictions on emissions of GHGs regardless of the limitation on their 
economic and technological capabilities. This need for restriction on emissions of GHGs 
by developing states exists despite the fact that the past responsibility of developing 
countries for causing climate change is smaller than that of developed states.2  
                                                 
1Paul G Harris, “What is Fair?; International Justice from  an Environmental Perspective” available online 
at http://www.ciaonet.org/isa/hap01.html. (Last visited on March 31, 2004). (Unilateral efforts by 
developed industrialized countries, while essential as a first step, will be overwhelmed as the large 
developing countries use more energy and produce more environmental  pollutants. If China burns its vast 
coal reserves and Brazil cuts its expansive rain forests, greenhouse gas levels will increase beyond the 
potential control of the industrialized countries).  
2See generally, Daniel Barstow Magraw, “Legal Treatment of Developing Countries: Differential, 
Contextual and Absolute Norms” (1990) 1 Colo. J. Int’l Envt’l. L. & Pol’y 69.  
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               As noted in this thesis, there are arguments that support all aspects of the DR 
Principle in the climate change context. Some of these arguments are meritorious. 
However from the point of view of environmental protection, a better strategy towards an 
effective solution to climate change is to adopt an approach that places some restriction 
on GHG emissions by developing countries. This can be achieved if developing countries 
agree to reduce their GHG emissions by an agreed percentage. Incentives in the form of 
meaningful, financial/technological or economic aid programmes can be used to assist 
developing countries in meeting those emission targets.3 This approach would enable 
developing countries to internalize an environmental friendly approach in order to 
prevent climate change now and in the future. 
         An effective solution to human induced climate change can only be reached when 
the leadership principle of developed countries in preventing climate change is combined 
with binding GHG emission targets which are assessed on developing countries. The 
inclusion of developing countries should however be based on a DR Principle that places 
some limitation on GHG emission by developing countries but also makes provision for 
financial/technical assistance to such countries. This approach gives consideration to the 
“specific needs and special circumstances of developing countries.”4 In addition, this 
approach takes into account the limited capability of developing countries as well as the 
historical responsibility of developed countries for climate change. It also has the 
capability to encourage the economies of developing countries to grow in an 
                                                 
3See also 143 Congress Records at S 8124 (daily ed. July 25, 1997) (Comment by Senator Patrick Murray). 
4Articles 3(2) and 4(4) of The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992, [“FCCC”]. 
For a full text of the Convention, see 31 I.L.M 849. 
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 environmentally friendly direction obviating the need to re-address the problem that 
could arise from future emissions.5 
                If the assistance rendered to developing countries is combined with 
commitment by them to reduce GHG emissions, an effective solution to climate change 
may be achievable. This approach is appropriate because most developing countries lack 
the technology and the financial muscle to take measures in order to channel their 
economies in a low GHG emissions growth track. 
         The suggestion that there should be some restriction on emission of GHGs by 
developing countries is necessary for at least three reasons. First, although developed 
countries account for a disproportionate share of GHG emissions, as developing countries 
continue to grow, their emissions will increase and exceed that of developed countries.6 
As a result, the current effort to mitigate climate change will be enhanced if developing 
countries are encouraged to place restrictions on their emissions of GHGs.7  
          Second, binding emission standards on all countries represents a long-term solution 
which takes into account the possibility that developing states will soon become leading 
emitters of GHGs. The binding emission standards should not be the same for developing 
countries. Considerations based on the peculiar circumstances of each developing country 
should influence the target imposed on the country. This would, conform with the DR 
Principle, while also achieving substantive equality among developing countries. 
                                                 
5See Richard B. Stewart, “Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness” (1993) 102 Yale 
L.J 2069, 2080 (On the need to encourage economies of developing countries to grow in an 
environmentally friendly direction). 
6Daniel Bodansky, “Managing Climate Change” (1992) 3 YIEL71. 
7Ibid. 
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               Third, since negotiations for the second commencement period of the FCCC are 
meant to start later in the year, it is important that countries formulate an effective 
international strategy and agreement in order to prevent climate change. 
              Restriction on GHG emissions by developing countries in the manner canvassed 
in this thesis should be a welcome development because it re-affirms that developing 
countries have common responsibility to address climate change but that their 
responsibility will remain differentiated from those of developed, and much more 
capable, industrialized developed countries. It acknowledges the historical culpability 
theory based on a perception that climate change has mainly been caused by developed 
states and should be tackled primarily by them and was never intended to be a 
justification for allowing developing states to continue to engage in activities that would 
cause climate change.8 
                To encourage developing countries to participate and agree to be bound by 
agreements to limit GHG emissions, the international community should model the DR 
Principle in the climate change regime along the same lines, as is the case under the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.9 Under this arrangement, 
countries would enter into an agreement on limitation of GHG emissions. The agreement 
should have provisions which will commit developing countries to emission limits on the 
basis that compensatory financing and technology transfer will be offered by developed 
                                                 
8Patricia Birnie and Allan Boyle, International Law and the Environment, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003). 
9Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 26 ILM 1550 (1987). 
 Particularly Articles 5 and 10 (On financing terms as an incentive to developing countries. Under Article 
10, there exists a multi lateral fund which require developed countries to create a mechanism that provides 
financial and technical co-operation including the transfer of CFC free technology to the developing 
countries who otherwise have no access to it).  See also  Monica Brookman, “Equality Among Unequals in 
International Environmental Law” (2000) 25 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 369 at 377. 
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 countries.10 International funding can be used to compliment this model. Under this 
scheme, developed countries will contribute to a global fund, which would be used to 
finance GHG emission reduction projects in developing countries through the World 
Bank. The use of such funding arrangements re-iterates an important premise underlying 
the DR Principle, namely developed states should play a leadership role in the global 
effort to prevent human induced climate change. It is also in accordance with the notion 
of substantive equality which would justify preferential treatment of developing countries 
whose use of fossil fuel has been circumscribed by the consumption by the developed 
world. 
              Application of the DR Principle in the manner canvassed in this thesis also 
emphasizes the PP which focuses on and aims to prevent human induced climate change 
by promoting the global interest in order to mitigate climate change and avoid its 
devastating impacts. The need to prevent climate change, the PP should guide any GHG 
emission regime, as the long-term cost of climate change is higher than the cost of taking 
preventative action now.11 It is worth the immediate costs especially when compared with 
the remedial costs associated with the consequences of climate change. In this sense, 
money spent in preventing human induced climate change is money saved. 
          Climate change is a global problem that demands a global solution: emissions of 
GHGs in one country can affect the climate and individuals in other countries; also the 
consequences of inaction could be dangerous.  
As Athanasiou and Baer state: 
                                                 
10Harald Hohman ed,. Basic Documents of International Law Vol 1 (London:Graham and Trotman, 1996) 
547. 
11Bing Ling, “Developing Countries and Ozone Layer Protection, Issues, Principles and Implications” 
(1992) 6 Tul. Envt’l L.J 91, 99. 
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 “Understand that in a world beset by ecological crisis, 
distributive justice must mean more than it did in the past. It must 
include not only the fair distribution of wealth, resources, and 
opportunities, but the fair distribution of “impacts” as well. 
Because the elemental truth is that as the storms become more 
violent and the droughts more fierce, some of us will be hurt far,  
far more, and far earlier, than others. The rich will be able to 
hide, but the poor will not, and neither will the plants and the 
beasts. . . . Climate change must be minimized, but at this point 
severe impacts are entirely inevitable. The harm these impacts 
bring to the poor—always the most vulnerable—must be 
minimized, and then alleviated, while the “burdens” of 
“adapting” to climate change must be honestly addressed, fairly 
distributed, and adequately funded. Anything else would be 
unjust and lead inevitably to distrust, bitterness, and failure.”12 
 
 Accordingly, cursory participation by developing countries in the international 
global climate change regime should be encouraged because developing countries also 
stand to benefit from preventative actions taken now, as do we all. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12Tom Athanasiou and Paul Baer Dead Heat: Global Justice and Global Warming, (New York: Seven 
Stories Press, 2002), 41-42. 
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